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Crisis in Maluku deepens 
After a short lull, renewed violence has erupted in Ambon and North Halmahera. At least 38 people 
were killed in a week of violence in Ambon City and scores were killed in Christian villages in North 
Halmahera, with hundreds more seriously wounded. Maluku 's military commander, Brig. General 
Tamaela issued a shoot-on-sight order on 19 May in Ambon, signalling yet again that the army can 
think of nothing but a military solution. 
In a series of well-planned raids, gangs of men attacked 
three Christian villages in North Halmahera. The first was 
on 25 May when there was a fierce attack on Mamuya 
village in the Galela district of Halmahera. According to 
church sources, no fewer than 25 villagers were killed and 
52 injured, while eight of the attackers also died. The attack-
ers stormed the village from the sea and from the surround-
ing hills. The attackers who were killed were armed with 
standard military weapons. Brig. General Max Tamaela 
acknowledged that the small number of troops in 
Halmahera were powerless to stop the slaughter. 
Four days later, there was a similar attack on the villages 
of Makete and Duma, also in Galela district, when at least 
fifty people were killed. The deputy chief of the Gale la-based 
Synode Masehi Injil Halmahera Church, Rev. Biso said that 
more than one hundred were injured and taken to a Christian 
hospital, 40 kilometres away. 'Most of the victims were 
injured due to bomb shrapnel and gunshot wounds. Houses 
also were burned and many died in their sleep,' Biso said. 
Suharto clique behind the unrest 
Many commentators have spoken about 'dark forces' 
being behind the unrest in Maluku and other parts of 
Indonesia without being able to identify who exactly they 
mean. But now Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono has 
pointed the finger directly at former dictator, Suharto. 
He told the press that supporters of Suharto were stirring 
up violence to try to shake the government of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Asked whether he thought followers 
of Suharto were behind the attacks, Sudarsono said: 
'Yes ... and based on the information which I have received 
from the police and the military intelligence sources, these 
people are in Jakarta.' The minister said he had information 
that followers of Suharto had been helping fund the jihad 
fighters. [Reuters, 1 June 2000] 
Few doubt that the latest attacks on North Halmahera 
were the work of a new group calling itself Laskar Jihad 
Ahlus Sunnah, (Muslim para-militaries) which is dedicated 
to waging a holy war in Maluku. 
Jakarta dithers while Maluku burns 
Shortly before the new outbreak of violence in Ambon 
and Halmahera, Brig. General Tamaela was in Jakarta for 
consultations, including with President Wahid. On his 
return, he was unable to drive by road to Ambon City from 
Pattimura airport because security conditions in the resi-
dential district on the way were so bad, and had to go by 
speedboat. The next day, armed forces chief Admiral 
Widodo arrived for a tour of inspection but he didn't dare 
land or travel anywhere by road. He confined his visit to an 
inspection from the air by helicopter and spent the night at 
a naval base. As for Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
who was assigned by the president to resolve the Maluku 
crisis, she skipped Arnbon altogether on a trip that was 
supposed to have taken her to several parts of eastern 
Indonesia. 
While government and army leaders speak mostly in 
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tenns of a military solution, it is obvious that the security 
forces are not in control in many parts of Ambon. The 
number of firearms in the hands of the warring parties has 
increased dramatically. This has only added to the sense of 
hopelessness in restoring anything approaching calm in 
Ambon and throughout Maluku. Recently, Brig. General 
Tamaela warned that snipers were hiding in the wreckage of 
tall buildings. 'If they refuse to surrender, the troops have 
been ordered to fire (from) their armoured vehicles.' 
The aim of Tamaela's mission to Jakarta was to report 
that government authority had collapsed throughout 
Maluku and to plea for more troops. But troop reinforce-
ments from other parts of Indonesia have only created new 
controversies as the two sides accuse the troops of taking 
sides with the reds (Christians) or the whites 
(Muslims). There is a high turnover of troops as • 
those coming from outside never remain for 
more than three months because of 'war fatigue' 
which quickly sets in a region as volatile as 
Maluku. 
No other conflict in Indonesia in the past few years has 
created such emotional responses. As with most socially 
engineered schemes in Indonesia, it can only be assumed 
that dark forces are providing huge sums of money for the 
upkeep, training and equipping of this dangerous group of 
men. People associated with the group made it clear that 
their intention was to go to Maluku to wage a 'holy war', 
and warned that if they were prevented from going, they 
would carry out their actions in Java. 
When the police moved in and closed down the training 
camp, in response to local protests, they faced little resis-
tance. Thereafter, home affairs minister, retired Lt. General 
Surjadi Sudirdja, pleaded with their leaders to abandon 
plans to go to Ambon, saying that they would undermine the 
fragile peace that had lasted for a few 
weeks. In the event, nothing was done 
to prevent them from going, further 
proof, if such was needed, that even at 
the highest level, the government lacks 
the authority or the political will to 
halt the spiral of violence. Incredible 
as it may seem, these high-spirited 
'warriors' were greeted on their arrival 
in Ambon by the two top officials, 
Governor Saleh Latuconsina and mili-
tary commander, Brig. General Max 
Tamaela. They brought with them nine 
containers of goods. Suspicions that 
they contained weapons proved wrong 
as they were full of food and relief 
goods for the suffering community. 
However, there is no shortage of 
The war (a term increasingly used these days) 
in Maluku has steadily worsened since the 
outbreak of the conflict in January 1999. As the 
death toll mounts on both sides, the chances of 
healing the wounds become ever more remote. 
Religious leaders on both sides have lost control 
of their communities; nowadays, vigilante 
groups on both sides are playing the dominant 
role . While analysts agree that the origin of the 
conflict is neither religious nor ethnic but rather 
social and economic, the fact is that both 
communities now perceive the conflict in reli-
gious terms. [See also TAPOL Bulletin No. 156, Malukans demonstrate at UN weapons, many of which had arrived 
• T k by other means. Laskar Jihad is 
i.;;..;=• 
January/February 2000]. 
Laskar Jihad arrive in Ambon 
The arrival early in May in Ambon of an estimated 2,000 
members of Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah from Java immedi-
ately added to the tensions between the two communities. 
The Laskar Jihad is a relatively new organisation which 
sprang up after the escalation of violence in Maluku last 
August. The first time a call for 'holy war' in Maluku was 
made was during a mass rally of Muslims in Jakarta last 
January which was addressed by senior Muslim politicians, 
including Amien Rais, who chairs the highest legislative 
body, the MPR. 
The Indonesian press, which now enjoys far greater free-
dom, has been responsible for highly partisan reporting 
about the fighting in Maluku. Some tabloid papers carry 
front-page reports daily about the 'extreme brutality of 
Christian Malukans' and their alleged aim to obliterate the 
Muslims. Public gatherings in many places where speakers 
address the crowds in highly emotive language have led to 
the mobilisation of youngsters ready to sacrifice their lives 
to defend Islam in Maluku. 
In April, it emerged that Laskar Jihad members were 
undergoing para-military training at a camp near Bogor, 
West Java. Local inhabitants started protesting because 
activities inside the camps were creating tensions in the 
neighbourhood. It also emerged that grisly scenes were 
shown being shown on television to the trainees. Laskar 
Jihad soon earned a reputation as a brutal vigilante group. 
office m Ja arta clearly well organised and carefully 
planned every aspect of its infiltration of Maluku. 
Once the news spread among Christians that the Muslim 
mob had arrived, only a spark was needed to ignite a prairie 
fire, which is precisely what happened. The spate of killings 
in Ambon City was the immediate result. 
Total apartheid 
In the course of 1999 many parts of Maluku have 
become completely segregated. The beautiful mosaic of the 
past, Muslim and Christian living in harmony next to each 
other, has now become a nightmare. If one travels from one 
island to another, the voyage needs careful planning. 
Muslims must take care to travel from one Muslim enclave 
to another and may have to take circuitous routes by sea or 
land to avoid passing through Christian areas. And the same 
goes for the Christian traveller. 
To gather information about the death toll and other 
casualties, Christian and Muslim hospitals have to be inves-
tigated. Any objective account of the day's events means 
obtaining statements from the Protestant Church and from 
the local MUI chapter, the Muslim council. 
At the top of the administration things appear to be very 
even-handed. The governor is a moderate Muslim, the army 
chief is a Christian and the chief of police, Brig. General 
Dewa Astika is from Bali with a Hindu background. But 
below this, the social fabric has been torn apart. While 
informal leaders, Christian and Muslim, have lost control of 
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their respective communities, communities take their cue 
from firebrands in their early twenties who are militaristic 
in their behaviour, while many well-armed youth gangs 
from both sides have emerged. Anyone who mentions the 
idea of dialogue or understanding towards the 'enemy' is 
seen as a traitor. A year ago, traditional weapons were being 
used, but now, there has been an influx of firearms on both 
sides, changing the very nature of the fighting. Standard 
military weapons are everywhere, including semi-automatic 
rifles and even rocket missiles on both sides. Firearms are 
no longer the monopoly of the security forces. 
Situation in North Maluku worsens 
While in most islands in Central Maluku such as 
Ambon and Saparua, the religious communities are roughly 
equal, the situation in North Maluku has changed for the 
worse. The demographic make-up of the islands of Ternate 
and Tidore has changed, becoming almost entirely Muslim; 
Christians have either been driven out or killed. The north-
ern part of Halmahera has become entirely Christian. Large 
areas in North Maluku have been depopulated because 
people are afraid to return to their villages. Crops, livestock 
and homes have been destroyed and many are living in 
squalid conditions in temporary camps. 
It is estimated that 4,000 people have been killed in the 
past nine months in North Maluku alone, which has led to a 
total upheaval. Economic activities are at a standstill, all the 
shops have been destroyed; peasants have deserted their 
fields and fishermen have stopped fishing. The attack on 
the three villages in North Halmahera was bound to happen 
with Muslim groups being determined to take over 
Christian-controlled areas throughout the region. 
The danger that the Muslim-Christian conflict might 
spread to other parts of Indonesia is ever-present. This 
happened last January with devastating consequences in the 
nearby island of Lombok in the Nusatenggara string of 
islands when several days of violence forced the small 
Christian - mostly Chinese - community to flee. [See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 156, January-February 2000] Although 
Lombok has remained calm recently, the thousands of 
refugees still in Bali say they are too afraid to return to their 
homes. 
Clashes between the two religious communities flared 
up in Poso, Central Sulawesi several weeks ago. Then, after 
a period of calm, they erupted again in late May when thou-
sands clashed in Sayo and Poso Pasisir, on the outskirts of 
Poso, with petrol bombs thrown and arrows fired from both 
camps. At the last count, five people had been killed. The 
violence has driven most of the population of Poso away and 
the town is largely deserted. 
Foreign social workers decide to leave 
Following the latest eruption of violence in Ambon, the 
last remaining foreign social workers told Governor Saleh 
Latuconsina they could no longer remain. The fifteen social 
workers are attached to the UNDP, Medicine sans Frontieres 
and other organisations. ACS, a French NGO, told the 
governor: 'Our jobs have been disturbed. The clashes are 
nonsense and have been too brutal. We feel pressured.' The 
social work being carried out by these relief workers, 
assisted by 500 local volunteers, was one of the few bright 
spots for almost 90,000 internally displaced persons from 
both sides still remaining in Maluku. The departure of the 
foreign social workers will have a dire effect on the fate of 
the tens of thousands of IDPs. Altogether there are 200,000 
IDPs who have been uprooted by the spiral of violence, 
many of whom have fled to other parts of Indonesia. 
Light at the end of the tunnel? 
It is more than true to state that the 32-year Suharto 
dictatorship is to blame for the collapse of civil society in 
Maluku, but the task of seeking a solution is urgently 
needed. Yet, quick solutions are not easy as the wounds are 
very deep and an intricate process of reconciliation at the 
grassroots will be needed. The economic meltdown in the 
urban areas of Maluku helped to accelerate the violence. 
Besides the 200,000 people who have fled the region, at 
least 100,000 people are unemployed. The violence has 
severely disrupted the market economy, many markets have 
been razed and small traders and food producers have been 
forced to evacuate to other islands. The army of unemployed 
is helping to boost the numbers joining the vigilante groups 
on both sides. 
Thamrin Tomagola, a Muslim academic from North 
Maluku, has been urging the government in Jakarta to act 
swiftly but so far the authorities have done hardly anything 
constructive. He identifies three groups, each with their 
own political agenda and each playing a destructive role. 
The first group consists of military groups and residual 
networks from the old regime. These are often referred to 
as the 'dark forces' or 'dirty hands '. The second group is 
the Poros Tengah (the Centre Axis, a loose coalition of 
Muslim parties and groups, some of which are in the 
government). Their agenda is to keep the situation in 
Maluku on the boil as part of their campaign to undermine 
the position of both President Wahid and Vice-President 
Megawati. The third group consists of the emerging vigi-
lante gangs from both sides who benefit from the continu-
ing crisis. Violence is their hallmark, their raison d 'tre . 
Politically they are emerging as leaders of the communi-
ties, taking over from traditional informal leaders; finan-
cially they are kept going by the injection of a large amount 
of 'relief' money. 
Despite this bleak reality, efforts to promote peace and 
dialogue among the warring parties are gradually begin-
ning. Several initiatives at grassroots level have emerged 
with varying degrees of success. The demand by Christian 
leaders for a UN peace-keeping force in Maluku is under-
standable but pre-conditions are necessary, with both 
communities agreeing on some kind of international inter-
vention and also agreeing that peace and reconciliation is 
the only way forward. Unless people can shake hands at the 
grassroots again, solutions imposed from the top are bound 
to fail. 
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Show trial in Aceh a setback for justice 
As widely predicted, the first of a series of trials about grave human rights violations in Aceh, turned 
out to be a show trial which was staged to divert attention from the systematic campaign of violence 
pursued by the Indonesian armed forces for more than eighteen months. Twenty-four low-ranking 
soldiers and a civilian were charged with murder even though it was clear that the victims, a Muslim 
cleric and scores of his pupils, were killed in an operation planned by senior-ranking officers. 
The trial was held in connection with the massacre on 23 
July 1999 of a Muslim cleric, Teungku Bantaqiah, and 56 
men who were attending his religious school in Beutong 
Ateuh, West Aceh. Thirty-four of the victims, including T gk 
Bantaqiah, were shot dead in cold blood when troops 
opened fire on the defenceless men; the other twenty-three 
who were wounded during the attack were driven away in 
army trucks, shot dead one by one and thrown down a ravine 
some distance from the school. 
The Bantaqiah Massacre is one of five atrocities chosen 
for special attention by a team set up while B.J. Habibie was 
still president to investigate acts of violence in Aceh. 
Announcing its findings last October, the team said that it 
had gathered information regarding no fewer than seven 
thousand cases of serious human rights abuses in Aceh 
during and after the period when Aceh was a so-called 
Military Operations Zone or DOM, dating back to the 
beginning of the 1990s. The other four atrocities investi-
gated by the team were the raping of an Acehnese woman 
by a soldier in August 1996, systematic torture at an inter-
rogation centre known as Rumah Gedong which was run for 
years by Kopassus, the army's elite commando corps, a 
massacre in the village of Idi Cut on 2 February 1999, and 
a massacre at the KKAjunction on 3 May 1999. 
Although the armed forces were forced to lift DOM in 
August 1998 in response to the wave of anger against years 
of terror and repression that followed the downfall of 
General Suharto in May 1998, the campaign of terror has 
continued unabated to the present day. 
No end to impunity 
The decision to try the men who took part in the 
Bantaqiah massacre in a joint military-civilian court, a so-
called koneksitas court, in spite of criticism from civil soci-
ety in Aceh and human rights groups in Indonesia, was a 
clear sign that the new Indonesian government is not 
committed to ending the cycle of impunity that was the hall-
mark of the Suharto regime. The set-up gave the military 
every opportunity to tamper with the judicial procedure 
from start to finish. Perhaps the most glaring abuse of 
procedures was the disappearance of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sudjono, intelligence assistant of the East Aceh Lilawangsa 
district military command who was known to be a key 
figure in the lethal operation. His immediate superior, the 
commander of Lilawangsa, was the officer who issued the 
order for the operation against the Bantaqiah school. 
Even though Sudjono was under investigation and was 
slated to be the most senior-ranking officer to face charges 
for the killings, he disappeared early on in the investiga-
tions, having apparently been given permission to go on 
leave last November. Ever since the army acknowledged in 
March that Sudjono had gone missing, it has failed to 
respond to repeated requests from the attorney-general, 
Marzuki Darusman, for an explanation about his where-
abouts. 
On 22 April, members of Kontras, which campaigns on 
behalf of the disappeared and the victims of violence, spot-
ted Sudjono at Jakarta's international airport in the 
company of army officers and saw him being driven away in 
a vehicle bearing a military number-plate. When this was 
reported to the attorney-general, he said he could only 
conclude that efforts were being made to prevent Sudjono 
from attending the Bantaqiah trial. It was quite understand-
able, he added, for people in Aceh to be deeply sceptical 
about the fairness and objectivity of the Bantaqiah trial, 
'especially in view of Sudjono's disappearance'. [Suara 
Pembaruan, 29 April 2000] Such is the lack of faith of the 
head of Indonesia's prosecution service in the koneksitas 
trial held in Aceh. 
A deeply flawed trial 
Fourteen of the 24 soldiers who went on trial were from 
the regional territorial forces; the other ten were members of 
Kostrad, the army's strategic command, several of whose 
units have been on special operations in Aceh. The highest-
ranking soldier in the dock was a captain and two others 
were second lieutenants; all the rest were sergeants or 
privates. 
The indictment states that the order to mount the opera-
tion was issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Syafriel Armen, 
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commander of the Lilawangsa district military command, 
who sent cables to five local army units on 15 July, stating 
that an operation be conducted 'to search for, find, approach 
and arrest leaders and sympathisers of the GPK (a term used 
by officialdom for the Free Aceh Movement) dead or alive'. 
According to the indictment, a joint forces command 
was set up under a Kostrad officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Heronimus Guru. As became evident during the trial, 
Heronimus Guru and the absent Sudjono were fully in 
charge at the time of the killings. Another middle-ranking 
officer, Major Endi, headed a so-called back-up team taking 
part in the operation. 
While immediate responsibility for the operation was 
clearly in the hands of these more senior officers, none of 
them was charged, even though they were called as 
witnesses. The irony of such a situation surpasses belief. 
During the trial itself, the only persons to testify apart 
from these officers were the defendants. All of them with 
one exception presented an obviously well-rehearsed 
account of what happened, alleging that they were 
confronted by the threat of an armed assault and therefore 
opened fire in 'self-defence'. The one exception was 
second-sergeant Subur who infuriated the judges by contra-
dicting the testimony contained in his verbatim interroga-
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tion report (BAP). The report quoted him as saying that 
several of Tgk. Bantaqiah 's pupils armed with knives had 
chased the Kostrad soldiers and that the sound of gunfire 
was heard. In court, he said this was untrue, blowing a 
mighty hole in the official version. Sergeant Subur also told 
the court that the wounded men who were loaded onto 
trucks were told that they were being taken away 'for 
schooling' . 'What on earth did that mean?', asked one of 
the judges. 'That's what we say in the army,' said Subur, 
'when we mean that we are going to murder someone, or 
finish them off' [Serambi Indonesia, 1 May 2000] 
All the men claimed that the order to open fire came 
from Sudjono. They also gave grisly accounts of how they 
were ordered to load the 24 wounded men onto three army 
trucks, to be taken away for 'schooling'; however, on the 
way, the trucks stopped several times to off-load the injured 
men and shoot them dead. These killings too, they all told 
the court, were carried out on the orders of Sudjono. No 
wonder he did a bunk! 
One can only conclude that the official version 
Demonstrators in Jakarta call for an end to the killings in Aceh 
constructed by the army placed the entire blame for the 
murders on Sudjono (who as intelligence officer at 
Lilawangsa was also responsible for the intelligence report 
that the Bantaqiah school has stashed firearms away, 
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making it a ' legitimate' target of attack in the war against 
the Free Aceh Movement). His 'disappearance' was clearly 
designed not only to save his own skin, but also to limit the 
charges to a group of low-ranking officers and prevent the 
massacre from being considered as part of a systematic, 
army-controlled operation to strike fear among the people 
of Aceh. 
Heavy sentences just part of the farce 
The court found all the accused guilty of murder and 
passed down sentences of between eight and a half and ten 
years. The prosecution had asked the court to charge the 
men on two counts of murder. In the event, the more serious 
count of conspiracy to commit murder, which carries a 
possible death sentence, was thrown out by the judges. Here 
surely is the biggest irony of all; the fact that the operation 
was planned one week in advance was clearly acknowl-
edged in the indictment. But because the men in the dock 
were not the ones who planned the operation, they were 
convicted as 'ordinary' murderers. 
Following their convictions, the 24 soldiers were taken 
to an air force base and flown to Jakarta, raising doubts in 
Aceh as to whether they will spend any time in prison. 
Moreover, strange as it may seem, one of the convicted men 
was arrested by air force officers as he was about to board 
the plane for Jakarta, after being found to be in possession 
of two kilos of marijuana. No one has explained how some-
one just convicted and apparently already in custody could 
be 'arrested'. His possession of marijuana also draws atten-
tion to strong suspicions that the real reason for the attack 
on Tgk. Bantaqiah and his followers had more to do with 
gaining control of marijuana crops (which are widely culti-
vated in Aceh primarily for traditional culinary purposes) 
than cracking down on armed separatists. 
Testimony that was never heard 
The most scandalous thing of all about the court 
proceedings was that no non-military witnesses were called 
and no one from the family of the murdered Tgk. Bantaqiah 
was heard, although his two wives and a daughter witnessed 
the operation, as did others at the school who survived. 
While the trial was in progress, one of the wives, 
Manfarisyah, denied press reports that she had refused to 
attend the trial as a witness. 'I am the one living witness 
who can give a precise chronology of everything that 
happened,' she told Serambi Indonesia [1 May 2000], 'yet I 
have never been summoned to appear.' 
The second wife with her daughter Fatimah adopted a 
different approach. They have repeatedly told the press that 
they were not prepared to testify for two reasons: they were 
not given firm safeguards for their personal security after 
the trial and they would only testify if the ones being tried 
were the officers who gave orders for the operation. 
[ Serambi Indonesia, 1 May 2000] Several weeks before the 
trial, these rdatives travelled to Jakarta to complain that 
their homes were being watched constantly by soldiers 
patrolling nearby access roads. 
When a senior member of the team of prosecutors was 
asked why relatives of the murdered religious teacher had 
not been summoned as witnesses, she said they had been 
unable to do so because 'the judges wanted the trial to end 
as quickly as possible' . She acknowledged that relatives of 
the deceased would have given the court a very different 
account of what had actually happened. [Serambi Indonesia, 
21 May 2000] The failure of the prosecution team to insist 
on testimony from civilian witnesses being heard suggests a 
high level of collusion between the prosecution and the 
judges. 
Fact-finding team's conclusions ignored 
The absence of such testimony was even more inexplic-
able, considering that six months before the trial, a fact-
finding commission set up by the provincial assembly 
(DPRD) published their findings after visiting the site of the 
massacre. They had found no evidence that the soldiers who 
approached the Bantaqiah complex encountered any resis-
tance to justify their decision to open fire. According to 
their findings, the teacher and his students were conducting 
Quranic readings (pengajian) when the troops opened fire. 
In fact, it being Friday and just approaching the hour for 
Friday afternoon prayers, the number of people in atten-
dance was far greater than on other days when they would 
have been out at work or tilling the fields. The team was 
also told that the troops looted goods from a nearby stall 
after shooting the stall-keeper dead. 
There was no evidence of firearms having been stored 
on the premises or of any para-military training having 
taken place. Local residents all denied these claims. They 
did however find evidence that the authorities 'conducted a 
false intelligence operation' to incriminate Bantaqiah and 
his students. Moreover, team spokesman Azhari Basyar said 
that following the bloody events of 23 July, some people 
visited the site to destroy evidence and construct their own 
version of the massacre. 'They forced all the village heads 
in the district to issue letters saying that they welcomed the 
death of Bantaqiah and his followers,' Azhari said. One 
village head told the team he had been forced to sign such a 
letter at gunpoint. 
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In the opinion of the fact-finding team, it would be 
pointless to accuse ordinary soldiers of the crime. 'The ones 
who must bear responsibility for the Beutong Ateuh 
massacre are the commander of the Lilawangsa military 
command, the Bukit Barisan regional military commander 
(which covers the whole of North Sumatra) and the former 
commander in chief of the armed forces, General Wiranto,' 
said Azhari Basyar. [ Serambi Indonesia, 31 October 1999, 
and Jakarta Post, 1November1999] 
Why was such a trial mounted? 
There has been widespread criticism of the Bantaqiah 
trial in Aceh as well as among human rights NGOs in 
Indonesia. A spokesman for Kontras went so far as to say 
that, far from breaking the cycle of impunity, the koneksitas 
court would actually perpetuate impunity. Pointing out that 
those responsible for the massacre had escaped justice, Ori 
Rahman of Kontras said: 'The only reason the trial was 
held was to dilute the demands and anger of the Acehnese 
people.' [Suara Pembaruan, 20 May, 2000] 
The Coalition of Acehnese Human Rights NGOs said in 
a statement issued on 22 May 2000 that the trial failed to 
comply with the standards set by numerous UN documents. 
'Trying the Bantaqiah case by means of a koneksitas court 
totally lacks legal credibility and is far removed from the 
sense of justice.' A group of low-ranking soldiers have been 
sacrificed to save the skins of superior officers, it said and 
called for a thorough investigation into the evidence which 
emerged in court regarding the actions of higher-ranking 
officers who must be held responsible for the operations of 
troops in their region of command. [See Press Release of 
Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh, 22 May 2000] 
One thing is clear: the Bantaqiah trial had nothing to do 
with the kind of justice for which the people of Aceh have 
been calling. The trial was primarily a political stunt to 
dissipate the growing pressure in Aceh for a referendum on 
the province's future status. Giving the accused very heavy 
sentences was simply part of the show. It was also hoped 
that western governments would be persuaded to believe 
that Jakarta is determined to pursue human rights violators; 
and indeed, in London and Washington, the Bantaqiah trial 
has been seen as a 'breakthrough' albeit somewhat flawed. 
The aim could be to make the koneksitas court accept-
able to the outside world as a way of dealing with human 
rights violators. Until now, the few cases when soldiers have 
been put on trial for such violations have all been heard by 
military courts. A koneksitas court with joint military and 
civilian responsibility might appear to be a suitable compro-
mise, which avoids confrontation with the armed forces 
which now appear to be flexing their muscles for a possible 
comeback. Meanwhile, moves to set up human rights courts 
in Indonesia are proceeding at a snail's pace and could well 
come unstuck in parliament (see separate item). This helps 
to strengthen the argument which is being put forward by 
foreign governments that, in the absence of human rights 
courts which might take months or even years to set up, any 
trial is better than nothi274ng. At the UN Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva this year, when the Indonesian 
mission strongly resisted the words 'in compliance with 
international standards' being attached to its pledge to set 
up human rights courts while a Chairman's Statement was 
being thrashed out, they started spreading the word that 
koneksitas courts could be the best way forward. 
But governments around the world who are pressing for 
properly constituted trials of crimes against humanity that 
were committed on such a massive scale in East Timor 
should take careful note of what has just happened in Aceh. 
Dozens of senior acting or retired army officers are 
currently under investigation for a range of gross human 
rights crimes during Suharto's New Order era. It is more 
than logical that schemes are now afoot to ensure that, if any 
trials are mounted, the cream of Indonesia's military 
establishment past and present will not be called to account 
and the pattern established in Banda Aceh will become the 
tradition. 
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Three-month peace accord in Aceh 
An agreement to end violence in Aceh for an initial period of three months has been reached between 
the Indonesian government and GAM, the Free Aceh Movement. The accord, known as the Joint 
Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause, could, if successful, usher in a period of calm in the war-
torn province where more than four hundred people have been killed since the beginning of the year. 
But the TN/ may develop devise a new strategy to continue to destabilise the situation in Aceh. 
The agreement was signed in Davos, Switzerland, after a 
series of meetings between Indonesian government repre-
sentatives and representatives of GAM, the Aceh-Sumatra 
National Liberation Front, whose leader, Hasan di Tiro, has 
been living in exile in Sweden for many years. Both sides 
insist that they have not abandoned their positions on the 
future of Aceh, with GAM maintaining its demand for inde-
pendence and Indonesia sticking to its position that Aceh 
must remain a part of the Republic of Indonesia. However, 
the accord represents a significant move on both sides 
which could lead to improvements for the long-suffering 
people of Aceh. 
The accord was brokered by the Swiss-based Henry 
Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. East Timor 
apart, this is the first time ever that the Indonesian author-
ities have accepted the role of an international agency to 
seek a solution to a regional rebellion. This could pave the 
way to international intervention in other conflict areas. 
Jakarta has been at pains to insist that the agreement 
does not signal recognition of GAM even though govern-
ment representatives will sit as equals with GAM represen-
tatives on the two joint committees to be set up. When 
foreign minister Alwi Shihab was on his way to Geneva to 
attend the signing ceremony, he was instructed not to 
proceed as his presence might be construed as 
recognition. Nor should this be regarded as a 
'cease-fire' according to Jakarta, for the same 
reason. Clearly there are concerns in Jakarta about 
the way the accord is perceived, while some 
commentators, including former President 
Habibie's top advisor Dewi Fortuna Anwar (who 
played such a key role in bringing about a UN role 
in East Timor) and members of parliament in 
Indonesia have criticised the deal for conceding a 
role to an international agency. 
Details of the accord 
Under the terms of the accord which was 
signed on 12 May, two joint committees and a 
monitoring team will be set up in Aceh, a Joint 
Committee on Humanitarian Action to handle the 
delivery of humanitarian relief, and a Joint 
Committee on Security Modalities which will 
focus on efforts to reduce the level of violence. 
The two committees will be composed of ten 
members, five from each side, while the monitor-
ing team will have five members. In addition, a 
Joint Forum will be set up in Switzerland to over-
see developments on the ground. 
The accord acknowledges that the security 
committee will have to deal with acts of violence 
from 'third parties' as well as from the two signatories. 
Indeed, much of the violence that has taken place in Aceh 
has been perpetrated by 'unidentified persons' making it 
difficult for the true culprits to be exposed and dealt with. 
The accord makes no provision for sanctions when viola-
tions occur but simply provides for the two sides to 'exer-
cise self-restraint'. In cases where no agreement is reached 
about a particular incident, the matter will go to the joint 
forum in Switzerland. Nor does it provide for a reduction in 
troops in Aceh. 
The accord was due to come into force on 2 June in 
order to allow time for the agreed structures to be set up. A 
representative of the Henry Dunant Centre travelled to Aceh 
to make the necessary preparations for this. Although it 
might have been expected that both sides would order their 
men to refrain from acts of violence before 2 June, there has 
been a rash of serious operations by Indonesian security 
forces, several of which have been 'justified' on the grounds 
that AGAM (GAM armed forces) bases had been discov-
ered. In the two weeks following the accord, at least 28 
people were killed. Several of the operations have been 
undertaken by an army unit called Rajawali, which appears 
to be the spearhead for combat operations. 
The worst incident occurred less than a week after the 
"kill the separatists" 
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accord was signed, when eight men were shot dead in Hagu 
Barat Laut village, Lhokseumawe, North Aceh by security 
forces, who alleged that they were members of GAM. The 
killings occurred shortly after midnight on 18 May when 
troops surrounded a house in the village. While most neigh-
bours slept, the security forces opened fire, killing eight 
men. The police who carried out the action allege that 
weapons were found in the house and that those inside had 
opened fire. But neighbours dispute this and insist that the 
men were ordinary labourers, including several fishermen. 
'It is quite wrong to call them armed civilians,' said one 
neighbour who refused to give his name. One of the slain 
villagers named Usman eked out a living climbing coconut 
trees to pick the nuts.[Serambi Indonesia, 18 May 2000] 
There have since been calls for a thorough investigation into 
the incident. 
What chances of success? 
For many months, human rights and students' NGOs in 
Aceh have been calling on the two sides involved in the 
armed conflict to end the violence and make it possible for 
them to properly monitor atrocities and carry out humani-
tarian work on behalf of the victims and the thousands of 
displaced persons who have fled their villages in search of 
sanctuary from sweeping operations conducted by units of 
the Indonesian armed forces. A 'humanitarian pause' is 
precisely what they have been calling for. 
The key test will be whether the level of violence falls. 
While armed forces commander Admiral Widodo and the 
army's chief of staff, General Tyasno Sudarso, both 
declared their support for the accord, it remains to be seen 
how this works out in practice. Experience in other parts 
of Indonesia show that the security forces in the regions 
do not necessarily act in line with what Jakarta 
commands. The accord makes no provision for a reduc-
tion in the number of troops and, as a visitor who knows 
East Timor well told TAPOL recently, Indonesian soldiers 
on patrol and at check-points along the roads are very 
thick on the ground. 
While the army has so far failed to create militia groups 
in Aceh to act as their proxies - as happened with such 
devastating effect in East Timar - it is more than likely that 
the 'unidentified' perpetrators of many recent acts of 
violence are part of an army strategy to create confusion and 
instability. One well-placed people's organisation, Cordova, 
warned that once the humanitarian pause officially starts, 
members of the security forces will 're-group into small 
units, cast their uniforms aside, remove their insignia and 
conduct assaults, robberies, kidnappings, acts of arson 
against public facilities'. [Statement by Otto Syamsuddin 
Ishak, 28 May 2000] 
Moreover, by concluding an accord with GAM, the 
Indonesian government has failed to recognise that GAM is 
only one part of the resistance to Indonesian rule and that its 
writ does not run throughout Acehnese society. There are 
fears that the accord will marginalise the many organisa-
tions working within civil society which were able to bring 
hundreds of thousands of people out onto the streets last 
November in a huge display of support for a referendum. 
The intensification of localised violence in all parts of the 
province has made it virtually impos~ible for these o~gru;ii­
sations to function beyond the conf mes of the provmcial 
capital, Banda Aceh. Such an enforced restriction to their 
ACEH 
activities, along with the inevitable pre-occupation with the 
deteriorating human rights situation has made it increas-
ingly difficult to devote attention to their more political 
demands. These factors have created the impression that the 
movement for a referendum has run out of steam. 
According to Cordova, the many human rights monitor-
ing groups in Aceh should continue to play a very as~ert~ve 
role in monitoring acts of violence during the humamtanan 
pause and not rely on the official bodies. The international 
framework within which they can now operate should be 
used to the full . 
West hopes accord will bolster RI unity 
The Clinton Administration was quick to welcome the 
signing of the Davos Accord, using this as an opportunity to 
re-state Washington's rejection of any moves for Aceh's 
separation from Indonesia. While praising both Jakarta and 
GAM 'for their willingness to embark on the path of peace' , 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, in a joint press 
conference with Indonesia's foreign minister: 'The United 
States supports dialogue aimed at achieving justice and 
peace in Aceh within the context of a united, democratic 
Indonesia.' [Jakarta Post, 17 May 2000] 
She also said the accord deserves support from the 
international community, which is taken as meaning that 
the US, for one, will contribute financially. It is likely that 
the three-month 'humanitarian pause' will see a sizeable 
influx of cash into Aceh, ostensibly to fund the re-building 
of burnt schools and government offices. Washington is 
known to have contributed financially to at least one 
recent conference in Aceh, on condition that the meeting 
refrain from adopting a pro-referendum resolution. On the 
occasion of President Wahid's first visit to Washington last 
November, the administration made it clear that it was 
ready to support Indonesia's territorial integrity, in many 
ways, including financial. One vital reason for such a 
stand is the determination to protect the major US invest-
ment in Aceh. Mobil Oil. Cynics might well argue that 
Mobil is more keenly interested than most in ending the 
armed conflict considering the vulnerability of its installa-
tions which have come under attack in the past few 
months. In late May, two employees of the company were 
kidnapped and held for two days by 'unidentified' 
assailants who demand a ransom of Rp4 billion. The men 
were released without payment of any ransom but the 
kidnappers warned that they would still be pressing for 
money from the company. 
On 17 May, the European Union also issued a state-
ment welcoming the Davos accord, reiterating its support 
for a 'stroI}g, democratic, united and prosperous 
Indonesia'. '· 
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The need for international justice 
Recent events suggest that demands in Indonesia and East Timor for accountab!lity,justice and an end 
to impunity will not be met for some considerable time. A draft bill on human rights courts now before 
parliament is deeply flawed and the judiciary needs a thorough overhaul. For the reasons s~t out helm':, 
we believe that an international tribunal is the only viable option for the trial of those m Indonesia 
responsible for last year's killings and violence in East Timor. 
International standards must be met language draft 
In the weeks before the publication on 31 January of the 
international commission of inquiry report into human 
rights abuses in East Timor, Indonesia lobbied hard at the 
UN to ensure that alleged perpetrators would be tried in 
Indonesia and not before an international tribunal. At the 
time, foreign minister Alwi Shihab acknowledged that the 
Indonesian process would have to meet 'international stan-
dards' to satisfy demands for justice. The UN agreed to 
await the outcome of the Indonesian investigations. 
In April, the UN Commission on Human Rights in 
Geneva adopted a Chairman's Statement on East Timor. An 
initial draft required Indonesia to set up a ' Special Human 
Rights Court that meets international standards of justice 
and fairness' . However, Indonesia fought hard to remove 
the reference to 'international standards', resulting in a 
weakened statement which merely refers to Indonesia's 
efforts to investigate and bring to justice the alleged perpe-
trators 'in the context of respecting international standards 
of justice and fairness'. These diplomatic efforts raise seri-
ous doubts about Indonesia's commitment to ensuring the 
credibility of its domestic process. 
A credible domestic process is essential for justice in 
Indonesia as well as East Timor. The Bantaqiah trial in Aceh 
was a serious setback [see separate item] , and investigations 
into the 1984 killings of hundreds of Muslim protesters in 
Tanjung Priok and the July 27, 1996 attack on the PDI party 
headquarters have been criticised by human rights NGOs. 
The draft bill on human rights courts to deal with these 
cases is now before the House of Representatives (DPR). 
No date has been set for its discussion, but the chair of the 
DPR's legislation board has indicated it will not get top 
priority. Once started, the deliberations could be lengthy; 
the military faction is likely to delay enactment into law, to 
protect armed forces personnel so many of whom face 
possible indictment 
There are already major problems with the procedures 
and substantive offences proposed by the draft bill and the 
quality of legal personnel available for the investigations, 
prosecutions and trials, issues that will take time to resolve. 
Given that Indonesia will not establish human rights courts 
which meet international standards for some time, the UN 
must set up an international tribunal for East Timor without 
further delay to satisfy expectations of timely justice. 
Special human rights courts 
The draft bill establishes a permanent human rights 
court and allows the president, on the recommendation of 
the DPR, to establish ad hoc courts to try cases involving 
past crimes. The following comments are based on an u~of­
ficial translation of the final draft, not on the Indonesian-
The decision to provide for ad hoc co~rts was ~ade ~fter 
much public debate about how to deal .with past vi~la~10ns, 
including those committed in East Timor. The difficulty 
arose from the fundamental right of an accused person not 
to be charged with an offence on acco17nt of an act that ~as 
not an offence at the time it was comrmtted, the rule agamst 
retroactivity. Although some crimes listed, such as geno-
cide were crimes under international law at the relevant 
time's, they were not crimes under Indonesian law. 
Eventually, the drafting committee decided that ad. hoc 
courts should be set up for specific cases of gross v10la-
tions . Insofar as ad hoc courts deal with crimes which were 
internationally recognised when they were committed, ~his 
breach of the rule against retroactivity is morally defensible 
and consistent with international standards. However, ad 
hoc courts should not have jurisdiction over crimes which 
were not previously crimes under international law or 
Indonesian law. A note should be added to the bill explain-
ing the justification for the ad hoc courts so that the new law 
does not create a precedent for future administrations to 
introduce oppressive, retroactive laws, as happened during 
the New Order. 
The fact that the ad hoc courts will be set up by the pres-
ident on the recommendation of the DPR is a matter of 
concern. This should be a judicial process and decisions on 
whether to pursue past violators should not be taken by 
politicians. Amnesty International has suggested that 
responsibility for establishing ad hoc courts might more 
appropriately lie with a reformed Supreme Court. 
Criminal offences 
The draft bill empowers the permanent and ad hoc 
courts to try cases involving 'gross violations of human 
rights' (Articles 1, 4 and 5). These include the crime of 
genocide, but do not include war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Other than genocide, the crimes listed as 'gross 
violations' bear some resemblance to crimes against human-
ity. However, the bill differs fundamentally from interna-
tional law on crimes against humanity in that, torture apart, 
it does not require the involvement of the state or a state-like 
organisation. Linking the conduct charged as a crime 
against humanity with an exercise of state power or state-
like power asserted by a political organisation, has been a 
central feature of international law on crimes against 
humanity as developed by decisions of the Nuremberg, 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals. It is included in 
the definition of crimes against humanity in the 1998 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
This defect goes to the heart of the issue of accountabil-
ity. Crimes could be passed off as ordinary human rights 
abuses and not crimes against humanity orchestrated by the 
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stat~/military. Junior officers could be targeted to protect 
~emor officers and political leaders from accountability as 
m the Aceh trial and in many other past cases. 
This is happening already. Concern that the East Timor 
investigation does not meet international standards because 
of 'its tendency to handle investigations into the violence in 
th~ territory as "ordinary crimes"' and not as 'political 
cnmes and crimes against humanity' have been expressed 
by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), the 
Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence 
(Kontras), the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights 
Association (PBHI) and the Institute for Policy Research 
and Advocacy (ELSAM). Leading human rights lawyer 
Munir said he feared the methods being used by the investi-
gation would incriminate only soldiers and low-ranking 
officers, while senior officers who were not 'directly on the 
ground' would not be implicated and would remain free of 
prosecution [Jakarta Post, 6 May]. 
Munir has also said the investigation into the Tanjung 
Priok massacre is not leading to disclosure of the alleged 
state crime against humanity. The investigation should be 
designed to question state policies that have caused violence 
in society, 'Otherwise, it would lead to the conclusion that 
it was a common human rights abuse and not a state crime 
against humanity' [Indonesian Observer, 5 May]. 
Apart from this, the definitions of some of the crimes 
listed as 'gross violations' are inconsistent with interna-
tional legal norms or lack clarity. In some cases, they are so 
broadly defined that they would appear to cover acts not 
normally considered criminal, let alone gross violations of 
human rights. 
Command responsibility 
Article 35 of the draft bill provides that a superior offi-
cial who is aware of, or should be aware of, a subordinate's 
attempt to perpetrate gross violations and failed to take 
preventive measures is liable as if he or she had committed 
the violation. This is very welcome, but the Article should 
also make it an offence for an official to fail to report a 
violation already committed by a subordinate. The bill 
should also stipulate that a person cannot avoid criminal 
responsibility because he or she was obeying an order of a 
superior officer. 
Inquiry 
Criminal proceedings in Indonesia start with an initial 
inquiry (penyelidikan) and then an investigation 
(penyidikan) to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence for prosecution. Article 8 of the draft bill provides 
for the inquiry stage to be carried out by Indonesia's 
National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM). 
Komnas HAM comprises 35 members who are appointed by 
the President on the advice of the DPR and Komnas HAM 
itself. Members are selected from experienced judges and 
lawyers. The fact that members are appointed and dismissed 
by the executive and legislature, rather than by a judicial 
body may be a cause for concern and lead to political inter-
ference in decisions on whether a particular criminal inves-
tigation should be instigated or proceed. 
Inquiries will normally be carried out by an ad hoc team 
appointed by the chair of Komnas HAM. Much depends on 
the persons appointed to the team. Komnas HAM s past 
record is mixed. The commission it set up to investigate 
violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM) was greeted by much 
initial scepticism, but carried out vital work in exposing the 
role of leading Indonesian generals. By contrast, there is 
much dissatisfaction with the team investigating the 
Tanjung Priok killings, particularly over its failure to exam-
ine mass graves and question high-ranking generals impli-
cated in the killings. Protesters have picketed the offices of 
Komnas HAM and demanded the replacement of certain 
members of the team [Kompas, 3 May]. 
Investigation and prosecution 
The investigation and prosecution stages will be under-
taken by an ad hoc investigator and public prosecutor 
appointed by the attorney general (Article 10). Again, the 
fact that appointments will be the responsibility of a govern-
ment minister, not a judicial body, is a matter of concern. To 
be eligible, a person has to be an Indonesian citizen, at least 
40 years of age, a law graduate, of sound mind, authoritative 
standing, honest, fair and of good character, faithful to 
Pancasila and the Constitution, and have knowledge of and 
concern for human rights (Article 10 (4)). 
The penultimate requirement, relating to Pancasila and 
the Constitution causes most concern. Pancasila is the offi-
cial state ideology, comprising five principles, which appear 
unexceptional, but are so broad that they have been inter-
preted and used by past presidents to curb dissent, enforce 
social and political control, silence political opponents and 
justify detention without trial and torture. The principle 
requiring a belief in the One God is in itself a violation of 
the right to freedom of religion. It has been cited recently 
by opponents of the president's call for the lifting of the ban 
against communism. 
The Indonesian Constitution adopted in 1945 has under-
pinned authoritarian rule for much of the last 55 years. In 
the words of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 
' ... the Indonesian nation has possessed as its Constitution a 
document almost infinite in its capacity for manipulation in 
the hands of later, autocratic rulers. This constitutional 
deficit has had profound implications for the rule of law and 
human rights .. .It has not and cannot act as the foundation 
of a State based on the rule of law ... ' ['Rulers Law', ICJ, 
Oct. 1999]. 
In other words, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are 
antithetical to human rights and it is hardly appropriate for 
judicial personnel, including Judges, involved in the inves-
tigation, prosecution and trial of human rights violators to 
be required to be faithful to them. This problem could be 
solved in part by early reform of the Constitution. 
The calibre and background of the personnel involved in 
investigation and prosecution will be crucial. Attorney 
General Marzuki Darusman has privately indicated that 
only one or two prosecutors are trustworthy. His office 
admitted that five state prosecutors were suspected of 
taking a Rp 12 billion bribe to conceal evidence [Jakarta 
Post, 11 May]. 
Considerable doubt has been cast on the independence 
of the investigation team appointed to follow-up the KP P-
HAM report on East Timor because of the inclusion of mili-
tary and police personnel. The team comprises 38 prosecu-
tc:>rs, 6 police officers, 10 military police officers, 1 O offi-
cials from the home ministry. An additional 15-member 
team of experts has been set up to advise and monitor the 
investigation. Leading human rights lawyer, Luhut, said: 
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I believe the team will not be able to act independently. 
Will those members be able to act independently of the 
organs to which they are attached. It must be abundantly 
clear that the investigation team should conduct its work in 
accord with universal judicial principles and conform with 
international standards [Suara Pembaruan, 20 April]. 
The danger is that this investigation will not be impar-
tial if it is undermined by the involvement of individuals 
who are not independent or seen to be so. The appointment 
of investigators and prosecutors independent of the admin-
istration and its various organs is vitally important. 
The courts 
Cases will be heard by five judges including at least 
three ad hoc judges and two judges from the related district 
court. Ad hoc judges will be appointed for five years and 
dismissed by the president in consultation with the Supreme 
Court. The eligibility criteria are the same as for investiga-
tors and prosecutors (including loyalty to Pancasila and the 
Constitution) except that an ad hoc judge must be at least 50 
years of age. This would bar many people who have spent 
years working on human rights. 
Notwithstanding the requirement for consultation with 
the Supreme Court, the independence of the judges is 
undermined in that responsibility for appointing and 
dismissing them is in the hands of the president. The ICJ 
makes the point in relation to the judiciary generally that 
consultation may be formal at best since in the past all three 
senior judicial posts in the Supreme Court were held by 
retired or existing military officers. The ICJ's solution is 
that candidates for judicial office should be appointed by 
the president on the recommendation of a Judicial 
Commission of members of the judiciary and organisations 
representing the private legal profession. Judges' should 
face dismissal only only if no longer worthy of judicial 
office [Ruler's Law, ICJ, Oct. 1999]. 
The draft law is silent on the conditions of service and 
remuneration of ad hoc judges. The Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary states that these matters 
should be adequately secured by law. If they are the respon-
sibility of the minister of justice, as they are with ordinary 
judges, the minister could reward judges whose decisions he 
or she approves. It is widely acknowledged that very few 
current judges can be regarded as independent and 
untainted by ingrained judicial corruption. It is encouraging 
that the bill does not require ad hoc judges to be appointed 
from the ranks of the judiciary. Hopefully, a significant 
number of appointments will be made from private lawyers, 
academics and others suitably qualified. 
Rights of the accused 
The draft bill includes no provisions to safeguard the 
accused's right to a fair trial. The Indonesian Code of 
Criminal Procedure (KUHAP) includes certain safeguards, 
such as the presumption of innocence and the right to legal 
assistance, but as the ICJ has pointed out, KUHAP was a 
creation and instrument of the New Order under Suharto 
and has proven inadequate in protecting human rights . 
The bill should, therefore, include standard trial rights 
relating to the presumption of innocence and various other 
rights such as the right to a public hearing and rights which 
ensure that the accused is able to conduct a proper 
defence. 
Article 26 of the draft law, which allows a court to hear 
and rule on a case in the absence of the accused, is unjust 
and incompatible with the right to a fair trial. This is espe-
cially the case in Indonesia, which has a record of scape-
goating junior officers and of 'disappearing' suspects who 
might implicate their superiors. Amnesty International 
suggests that the only exception to the general rule that an 
accused has the right to be tried in his or her presence 
should be if the accused has deliberately absented himself 
or herself after the proceedings have begun or has been so 
disruptive that they have to be removed temporarily. 
The penal provisions (Articles 30 to 34), which allow the 
courts to impose sentences ranging from three years to life 
imprisonment, appear reasonable. The decision to exclude 
the death penalty is welcome. However, statements by 
President Wahid that he will pardon leading generals if they 
are convicted is 36and amounts to unacceptable political 
interference in the judicial process. Justice will not be done 
and seen to be done unless appropriate punishments are 
handed down. 
Trials in East Timor 
There have been important developments in East Timor 
concerning the trial of pro-Indonesian militias. An embry-
onic legal system is being set up, but progress is inevitably 
slow. Resources are limited and inexperienced prosecutors, 
defenders and judges have to be trained. A UNTAET regu-
lation on the organisation of the courts assigns the district 
court in Dili with exclusive jurisdiction over genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The criminal code 
defining those crimes and the criminal procedure code have 
not yet been finalised. There are growing concerns about 
overcrowded jails, with some suspects having been in 
custody for more than seven months. 
A more detailed analysis of the human rights courts bill 
is available from TAPOL on request. 
Continued from page 15 
From all the discussions, it was clear that the partici-
pants were very clear in their minds on how to implement 
the new tasks and the conference provided the important 
impetus for this new strategy. 
It is widely acknowledged that issues like an interna-
tional tribunal for East Timor or resolving the refugee prob-
lem in West Timor require huge efforts at a time when inter-
national attention towards East Timor is fading. 'Old style' 
campaigning and lobbying are still needed while many soli-
darity groups have joined with the East Timorese in the 
reconstruction and development of their devastated country. 
The confe~ence drew attention to the two major tasks facing 
the East Timorese people: the process of reconciliation to 
guarantee peace with the vigilantes and Indonesia and the 
process of building a strong civil society and democratic 
institutions in East Timor. 
Solidarity with East Timor now goes far beyond the 
formal East Timor solidarity groups. It is the task of the 
initiators of the Utrecht meeting to define a new and larger 
construction for international solidarity with East Timor 
which will result in a much larger gathering in Baucau i~ 
the near future. 
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East Timorese refugees still stuck 
In May at least 124 people died in terrible floods in West Timor, half of whom were East Timorese 
refugees staying in camps near the border. As UNHCR strategies to speed the repatriation of refugees 
stagnate, this natural disaster may impel many to return. In the meantime humanitarian agencies in 
West Timor predict a malaria epidemic when the late rains finally subside. * 
Organised and spontaneous returns to East Timor now 
stand at 161,850, while at least 130,000 refugees remain in 
West Timor spread out over 220 known sites. The failure of 
the international community to press the Indonesian 
government on this issue has resulted in Jakarta allowing 
the problem to fester on. 
At first glance, the poor living conditions, low standard 
of health care and the hostile local environment would seem 
enough to encourage returns. However, below the surface is 
a complex, yet systematic, strategy to keep refugees in West 
Timor. Although a recent Indonesian census concluded that 
the vast majority of refugees wished to stay in Indonesia, 
local NGOs working in the camps say that at least 60 per 
cent would return home under the right circumstances. 
Militias are the chief barrier 
The presence of armed militias in the camps is the most 
crucial barrier to refugee return. Although human rights 
abuses have dropped within the last few months, the militia 
presence is a constant reminder to refugees of the terrible 
destruction in East Timor last September. It is this fear of 
retribution, intimidation and physical violence that keeps 
the East Timorese virtual prisoners in West Timor. 
The refugees are organ-
ised into cells based along 
territorial and bloodlines. 
These 'house societies' 
make it harder for refugees 
to make individual deci-
sions. The militias have 
exploited this system to 
manipulate large groups of 
people. Just as refugees 
were initially forced across 
the border in societal 
groups, so they remain, and 
so they must now return. 
The militias also control 
humanitarian aid inside the 
camps. This means that 
international NGOs have 
no control over distribution 
once food has been deliv-
ered. Militias are known to demand food from families. 
Such racketeering not only ensures that militia members 
and their families are kept healthy but it also perpetuates 
their power and authority within the camps. 
Disinformation serves to impress upon the refugees the 
militias' continuing power. Rumours are constantly circu-
lated about bad conditions in East Timor but more persua-
sive are reports in the local press. All five local newspapers 
publish propaganda articles by the militias and full page 
adverts advocating their cause. The airwaves are used to 
disseminate propaganda; Eurico Gutteres' recently released 
album, 'UNAMET, The Tragedy of East Timor' can be 
heard all over West Timor. 
UNHCR attempts to counter this propaganda have been 
fairly ineffective. Mistrustful of the UN, the refugees ignore 
the UNHCR boards with information on conditions inside 
East Timor. The mistrust stems from UNAMET's decision 
to leave East Timor after the referendum, leaving the 
Timorese at the mercy of the militia and the TNI. 
Many of the refugees are ex police, army and civil 
servants who continue to receive salaries and rations from 
the Indonesian Government. Were they to return, their 
wages would cease as would their pension rights, so there is 
a financial incentive not to return. 
UNHCR is powerless and ineffective 
The UNHCR is seen as being powerless against the 
militias. Their staff only enter camps with TNI escorts 
and have abandoned repatriation operations after intimi-
dation by militias. The UNHCR use TNI for their own 
protection which only serves to heighten the alienation of 
the UN from the refugees; in this way, the UN agency is 
in effect legitimising the 
TNI, a body feared by so 
many East Timorese. 
Local NGOs working 
with the refugees know the 
situation inside the camps 
much better than the 
UNHCR whose claims to 
have full access are false 
as that they never enter 
... without TNI escorts. 
Refugees are unlikely to 
talk openly with UN staff 
in the presence of armed 
Indonesian soldiers. The 
JRS (Jesuit Refugee 
Service) works closely 
with local NGOs and can 
East Timorese refugees in West Timor therefore deal effectively 
with the crisis. They oper-
ate a postal service of hand delivered letters enabling 
refugees to receive first hand knowledge of the situation 
in East Timor from friends who have returned. This relies 
on close co-operation with local NGOs. 
As long as the UNHCR continues to have what Craig 
Saunders, its chief of mission, calls a 'non-existent rela-
tionship' with local NGOs, they will never have a clear 
picture of what is going on in West Timor and their strate-
gies will continue to be ineffective. 
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Role of the TNI 
The other factor perpetuating militia control is the 
continuing involvement of the TNI who train militias in 
army barracks in TNI uniforms. While Colonel Jurefar, the 
district commander vehemently denies any army involve-
ment and denies the presence of militia inside the camps, all 
the evidence points to the contrary. Local NGOs report mili-
tias still receiving salaries and supplies from the TNI and 
the recent border incursions into East Timor were extremely 
professional. The UN Peace Keeping Force found militias 
involved in border raids to be dressed in TNI uniforms and 
bearing new weapons. 
The number of TNI troops in West Timor has increased 
significantly since the arrival of the refugees last 
September. TNI argue that they are there to protect the 
border in co-operation with the Peace Keeping forces. The 
presence of so many TNI has a psychological impact on 
refugees who cannot make spontaneous returns with so 
many Indonesian troops around. 
What is unclear is the extent of active TNI involvement. 
It seems now to be fairly low key, probably a small group of 
disaffected officers who refuse to accept the outcome of a 
free and independent East Timor. The role of the Battalions 
744 and 745 seems to have decreased. 745 has been 
dispersed to other parts of Indonesia while 744 remains in 
Ku pang. 
So, why do the militia continue to control the camps 
and why do certain elements of the TNI continue to 
support them? There is a certain amount of denial 
involved; the loss of power and status in East Timor has 
proved too much for many and so they have continued 
their war of intimidation and violence in West Timor. The 
leader of Besi Merah Putih is quoted as saying they have 
plans to infiltrate East Timor with modern weapons. 
Cancio Lopes de Carvalho, head of Mahidi militia, claims 
that he still commands 11, 15 8 troops in West Tim or. Fears 
of an extended guerrilla war have been backed by the 
continuation of training, involvement of TNI and border 
crossings. Rumours also continue about militias returning 
to strategic parts of East Timor to prepare for future offen-
sives. This is hard to prove either way, as there are no secu-
rity checks of refugees returning to East Timor through 
Batugade or Dili; during the border incursions in March, 
five armed militia smuggled themselves across the border 
disguised as refugees. 
Dangerous deadline 
Although Indonesia has stated that refugees have two 
years to decide whether or not to return home, the govern-
ment has announced that by end of June it will stop sending 
relief, leaving it to the international agencies. This could 
affect repatriation. The end of June could mark the start of 
a more aggressive policy of resettlement and transmigra-
tion. One NGO in Kupang says that the resettlement sites in 
West Timor are already full and expensive to run and 
refugees are likely to be transmigrated to other parts of 
Indonesia. This makes it increasingly vital for a compre-
hensive census to be carried out in West Timor to determine 
the exact numbers of refugees outside of East Timor, espe-
cially if transmigration plans are carried out. A census in 
East Timor would also help trace missing people and work 
out estimates of those expected to return. 
With such a deadline looming it is expected that the 
militias will step up their campaign. The original 3 ~ March 
deadline for an end to Indonesian aid prompted an mcrease 
in border incursions and trouble inside the camps during 
March. The militias may well see this June deadline as an 
encouragement for refugee return and spend June destabil-
ising the border region once more. 
How will it end? 
It is now nine months since over half of East Timor's 
population was forced across the border to West Timor. The 
130,000 refugees who remain do not represent the 20 per 
cent who voted for integration. They represent a population 
living in fear and confusion, the majority of whom would 
return home under the right circumstances. 
The recent floods are just another blow to their psycho-
logical wellbeing. Health conditions have improved and 
the death rate has decreased but this is still not a stable 
situation. Malnutrition is high, as are chronic eye and skin 
conditions. 
There is the danger of those in West Timor developing 
'chronic refugee syndrome', whereby the population 
becomes dependent on refugee aid. This would have disas-
trous consequences not only for the refugees but also for 
the local West Timorese population. In some areas the 
refugees outnumber the local population; in the Hakisak 
region there are 30,000 refugees compared to 7,000 local 
inhabitants. At the moment there is an uneasy truce 
between the two populations but this is unlikely to last. 
West Timor is one of the poorest regions in Indonesia and 
refugees occupy valuable rice land. At the end of May, 
there was a bitter clash in Tuapukan between refugees and 
local people which left four people seriously wounded. 
The window of welcome for them in East Timor is 
gradually closing. With not much justification, East 
Timorese in East Timor are becoming suspicious of those 
who remain in Indonesia and the refugees are also miss-
ing out on the vital first stages of development, rehabili-
tation and employment that are occurring on the other 
side of the border. 
UNHCR currently has plans to be in West Timor until 
December 2001. Such a long-term strategy may have disas-
trous consequences for the mental, physical and economic 
well being of all Timorese. It is vital that militia are sepa-
rated from the camps in order for all refugees to be able to 
freely make the decision to return or remain. The interna-
tional community must continue to lobby the Indonesian 
Government to ensure the repatriation of all East Timorese 
who want to go home. 
* This article is a report ofa TAPOL volunteer recently 
returned from a visit to East and West Timor. 
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International meeting on East Timor 
From 12 to 14 May, 30 representatives of East Timor solidarity groups from 11 countries gathered in 
Utrecht to discuss and reassess their solidarity work with East Timor. It was the first international gath-
ering by solidarity groups after last year's referendum. 
There was a consensus about the new problems East 
Timor is facing. It was not difficult to spot the main prob-
lem, the deepening division between the population and the 
UNTAET bureaucracy, the aid agencies and foreign agen-
cies. The problem of resolving this and promoting greater 
participation for the East Timorese was the main topic of the 
three-day conference. 
Solidarity groups from around the world had been 
invited but because of financial constraints and the short 
notice, most of those present were from Europe. Also 
present were ETAN-US and the two Indonesian solidarity 
organisations, Fortilos and Solidamor. The next interna-
tional gathering will be in Baucau, East Timor before the 
end of this year. Unfortunately, the three CNRT representa-
tives to the European Community were still in East Timor 
while Jose Ramos Horta was unable to attend at the last 
minute as he could not to make a stopover before heading 
for Washington. 
The conference was hosted by the youngest group in the 
solidarity movement: the Free East Timor Foundation in 
Utrecht. 
A working meeting 
The conference was opened by the Portuguese ambas-
sador Santa Clara Gomes, an old friend of the East Timorese, 
who spoke about the new problems East Timor is facing. 
Liem Soei Liong from TAPOL gave a short history of 
the changing character of the solidarity movement since 
1975. From a severely isolated position in 1975, the soli-
darity movement gradually grew, especially after the Santa 
Cruz massacre in 1991 and the explosion of public attention 
in 1999. In each of the these periods, new solidarity groups 
emerged. In each period, the solidarity groups were a mani-
festation of the zeitgeist of the period. The first solidarity 
groups in 1975 expressed solidarity with Fretilin and 
campaigned for an independent East Timor. The groups that 
emerged after 1991 placed the emphasis on human rights 
violations and the right of self-determination, while the 
groups that emerged in 1999 have shown a strong commit-
ment to assisting the East Timorese to rebuild their country 
and avoid the mistakes made in Cambodia and Rwanda. 
While these differences were clear, there was for many 
years continuity in one vital respect, having to deal with the 
West's undying support for the Suharto regime, selling it 
arms and so on. 
The conference then split into four workshops as the 
participants were eager to give new substance to their new-
style solidarity work with East Timor. The first workshop, 
'development actions', dealt with a variety of topics: 
strengthening civil society, grassroots support, trauma, land 
reform, community organisations and co-operatives. 
The second workshop, 'monitoring the rebuilding 
process' , dealt with topics like: observing rebuilding, the 
utilisation of natural resources, sustainable agriculture and 
the follow-up of the Tokyo donor conference. 
The third workshop, 'justice and reconciliation', dealt 
with: ending impunity, an international tribunal , the refugee 
problem, seeking the truth about the violence in 1999 and 
human rights violations back to 1975. The fourth workshop, 
'capacity building/assistance for reconstruction ', dealt with 
scholarships for East Timorese, networking between East 
Timor and the international community, how to support the 
new university and how to assist East Timorese diplomacy. 
For a summary or a full report of the proceedings, 
please email the organisers of the conference: 
vrij oosttimor@yahoo.com. 
Fortilos and Solidamor 
Presentations by the two representatives from 
Indonesia gave invaluable insights into the solidarity 
work in Indonesia among the political elite and at grass-
roots level. Coki Naipospos from Solidamor described 
Solidamor's work in the last few years, including sending 
a large monitoring team to East Timor before the referen-
dum on 30 August. Solidamor activists are well aware of 
the fact that the East Timor issue helped to precipitate the 
downfall of Suharto. It was one of the issues that made 
the regime increasingly vulnerable . He also spoke of the 
gradual switch from an organisation focusing primarily 
on self-determination to one focusing on strengthening 
democracy, human rights and inter-nation peace in the 
Southeast Asian region, including East Timor. Promoting 
democracy, human rights and anti-militarism in Burma is 
now an important part of Solidamor's work. In the last 
few months Solidamor has also been the liaison office for 
CNRT, dealing with issues that go well beyond traditional 
solidarity work. 
Fortilos grew from an organisation in Jakarta set up to 
help East Timorese who were facing trial after the Santa 
Cruz massacre. Its work expanded to include assisting the 
dozens of East Timorese prisoners, sentenced and held in 
various prisons in Java. Fortilos was set up in March 1998 
to campaign for self-determination for the East Timorese 
and to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. It developed 
close relations with some of the main human rights NGOs 
in East Timor including Yayasan Hak. Through these 
contacts, it helped to establish three casa de povos 
(community centres). The casa de povo is a place where 
people can meet and try to resolve their problems. It is an 
integrated approach at grassroots level and can also gener-
ate grassroots expertise from outside for such purposes as 
training local people to set up co-operatives, trauma coun-
selling and many other useful activities. The presence of 
Lefi Malau from Fortilos inspired many of those present in 
Utrecht. 
New impetus 
The primary aim of the conference was to facil itate 
discussion among the solidarity groups about new ways and 
opportunities to express their solidarity. 
Continued on page 12 
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Solidamor office comes under attack 
The office of Solidamor, the leading Indonesian solidarity organisation for East Timor, was recently 
attacked and virtually destroyed by a gang of mostly East Timorese thugs. The attack on the office 
which took place in broad daylight in a busy Jakarta street and lasted less than half an hour was clearly 
intended as a warning to the organisation that has done more than any other in Indonesia to popu-
larise the cause of the people of East Timor. 
At around 4pm pm on Wednesday, 24 May, fifty people, 
mostly, pro-integration East Timorese, drove up to the 
Solidamor office on a truck. After breaking down the door 
and manhandling a member of staff, the gang, which, 
according to an eye-witness, was accompanied by a group 
of Indonesian soldiers who watched the attack from a 
distance, pushed their way in and immediately set about 
destroying all the office equipment and smashing the 
windows. The four people in the office at the time were 
physically assaulted and injured. Coki Naipospos, chair of 
the organisation, was injured in the left shoulder and arm 
and badly bruised in the stomach. 
Solidamor has for years played a critical role in dissem-
inating information about East Timor in Indonesia and has 
been in the forefront of efforts to build solidarity in 
Indonesia for the people of East Timor. It sent its own moni-
toring team to East Timor to keep an eye on events there 
before and during the UN ballot in August last year. It was 
recently appointed as the liaison office in Indonesia of the 
CNRT, the National Council ofTimorese Resistance. It has 
also become a centre for solidarity with people's movements 
in other countries of South East Asia and has recently 
launched actions in support of human rights activists in 
Malaysia and Burma. 
In what eye-witnesses described as a very professional 
operation, the attackers, who wore red-and-white headbands 
(the colours of the Indonesian flag), had within minutes 
destroyed virtually every piece of office equipment, includ-
ing two computers, a scanner, a fax-machine, a television 
set and a video machine. They then fled from the scene, 
taking a cash-box containing Rp 18 million (US$2,200), two 
telephones, a number of documents and the personal 
belongings of several activists and members of staff. A 
wallet containing Rpl.8 million belonging to Sapolo, a 
member of staff, was also stolen. 
The attack left the organisation without any office 
equipment and with no funds to repair the office or replace 
the lost equipment. As solidarity messages poured in from 
many parts of the world, a special international appeal was 
launched to help Solidamor get back to work as quickly as 
possible. 
The attack occurred ten days after a larger group of 
East Timorese claiming to represent refugees now in 
West Timor occupied the offices of the National Human 
Rights Commission for three days . The people involved 
called on the Commission to end their investigations 
into human rights violations in East Timor and accused 
the Commission of being subservient to UN human 
rights bodies, betraying national interests and 'selling 
out' the country. [Detik, web site, 1 May 2000] It is 
likely that the same people were involved in the attack 
on Solidamor. 
Solidamor activists in road accident 
Three days later, two Solidamor a~ti_vists, _Yeni Ro~a 
Damayanti and Sapolo, were seriously Injured m a traffic 
accident unrelated to the attack. They were both rushed to 
hospital where Yeni needed treated for several fractures in 
one arm, a fractured rib cage, cuts on the face and a 
disjointed left leg. Sapolo, who was driving the motorbike 
on which they were travelling was badly hit on the head and 
suffered from concussion. Yeni had been planning to travel 
to the US to attend a UN women's conference in New York. 
Militia-style operation 
Members of Solidamor who experienced the attack said 
it was reminiscent of the type of operations conducted by 
army-backed militias in East Timor following the ballot 
there on 30 August when nearly 80 per cent of the popula-
tion voted for independence. The pro-integration mob acted 
with deliberate intention to inflict as much physical damage 
in the shortest possible time on a group which sided with the 
East Timorese cause. They looted as much as they could 
carry off and stole a large number of Solidamor documents 
including print-out files and all the organisation's disks. 
The attack was clearly related to recent developments 
where dozens of army officers and pro-Indonesian East 
Timorese officials are facing investigations and possible 
indictment for crimes against humanity in East Timor. As 
more information becomes available in Indonesia about the 
orgy of destruction carried out by militias and the army in 
revenge for the results of the ballot, sympathy and under-
standing for East Timor has been growing. This is a devel-
opment which certain forces within the armed forces want 
to reverse and they hope to achieve this among other things 
by attacking Solidamor. 
Police slow to act 
The perpetrators of the attack fled the area before any 
police arrived on the scene. Later, however, when Coki 
Naipospos visited a hospital to get a medical report about 
the injuries he had sustained, he suddenly recognised some 
of the mobsters who were there receiving treatment. He 
immediately rang Yeni who was making representations at 
the district police command to ask her to report this. It was 
some time before the police decided to send a squad to the 
hospital. Coki immediately identified the men but the police 
were reluctant to make any arrests even though the men 
were boasting out loud that they had carried out the attack 
because they were 'pro-integration, lovers of the Indonesian 
state,' and because Solidamor 'was a CNRT puppet'. It was 
only after Yeni had appealed for more than an hour to the 
police to arrest the men that four men were arrested and 
taken to the police headquarters for investigation. 
Continued on page 22 
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West Papuans vote for independence 
At the end of May, the people of West Papua flocked in their thousands to an historic West Papuan 
People's Congress in Port Numbay (Jayapura) and proclaimed their right to independence from 
Indonesia. The government in Jakarta, having failed to understand the strength of feeling in West 
Papua, changed direction as the meeting got underway and tried to discredit the Congress, warning of 
dire consequences if the people's aspirations are turned into positive action. 
Press reports on 29 May from Jayapura described the 
city which West Papuans prefer to call by its former name 
Port Numbay as being bathed in the West Papuan 'Morning 
Star' flag, hanging from all buildings and draped on cars 
and fences. The Second West Papuan Congress was 
attended by three thousand delegates from all parts of the 
country including leading figures in the OPM and people 
from the diaspora. Tens of thousands more gathered in the 
streets, having flocked to the city from villages and towns, 
wishing to be present at the historic event. 
Re-writing history 
The Congress was held in implementation of a decision 
taken by a 500-strong meeting held in February this year 
which took a firm stand on the illegality of the so-called Act 
of Free Choice held in 1969. It was decided then that the 
main item on the agenda of the Congress would be to revise 
the history of West Papua, meaning in essence that the Act 
which resulted in West Papua's formal absorption into the 
Republic of Indonesia would be declared null and void. 
The February meeting set up a West Papuan Presidium 
Council which was charged with the task of convening the 
Second Papuan Congress and which appointed two leading 
tribal figures as co-chairmen. They are Theys Uluay who 
heads the officially sanctioned Irian Jaya Tribal Council, and 
Tom Beanal, leader of the Amungme people, who is 
renowned for his long battle to win recognition for his 
people's rights from the giant copper-and-gold company run 
by the US-based Freeport and the London-based Rio Tinto. 
The May/June Congress was held as a sequel to the 
First West Papuan People's Congress which was held in 
1961 when the territory was still under Dutch rule. That 
Congress declared West Papua's independence and adopted 
a national flag and national anthem. Re-writing history also 
means acknowledging the 1961 Congress as the moment 
when West Papuan independence was declared. Everything 
that has happened since then, the New York Agreement 
signed in 1962 which arranged for the transfer of West 
Papua from Dutch to Indonesian hands, without the pres-
ence of any West Papuan representatives, the Indonesian 
occupation which came into effect on 1 January 1963, and 
the 1969 Act, are all in violation of the 1961 declaration. 
The OPM which has waged an armed struggle for inde-
pendence since its establishment in 1965 was also repre-
sented. It is understood that three regional commanders, 
Bernardus Mawen, Mathias Wenda and Kelly Kwalik were 
all present, while keeping a low profile. However, 
Bernardus Mawen who is commander of the Merauke 
sector, led a delegation to Jakarta to meet the Indonesian 
president and present the demand for independence. As 
always on such occasions, the president made it clear that he 
would never support this demand. 
Quitting the Republic 
On the third day of the Congress, a resolution adopted 
unanimously at the previous day's working group declaring 
that West Papua would leave the Republic of Indonesia and 
set up its own state was presented to the plenary session. 
The resolution had been endorsed by delegations represent-
ing the fourteen districts of West Papua and was presented 
to a plenary session by Dicky Iwanggin who headed the 
delegation from Biak Numfor. 
Affirming that the New York Agreement, the Indonesian 
occupation and the Act of Free Choice were all unlawful, 
the resolution declared that the decision to hand over West 
Papua to Indonesia was the result of a conspiracy between 
the Netherlands, the US and the United Nations in support 
of integration with Indonesia. Zakarias Soungmen, head of 
the delegation from Merauke said that the West Papuan 
Presidium Council should be instructed to negotiate with 
Jakarta for a Memorandum of Understanding on the trans-
fer of power. This resolution is expected to form the core of 
the final decision of the Congress which ends on 3 June. 
The Constitution for a future State of West Papua was 
also discussed at the Congress 
These decisions fly in the face of Jakarta's intentions and 
are likely to lead to tensions if Jakarta adopts a confronta-
tive stance. This now seems likely, given the statements that 
were made by Indonesian government ministers while the 
Congress was in progress. 
On the third day of the Congress, West Papuan security 
personnel checking people as they entered the hall discov-
ered two bombs, 14 pistols and a sharp implement. The 
people carrying the weapons admitted that they were acting 
at the behest of an Indonesian soldier. It transpired that the 
14 pistols had been supplied by the 'Red-and-White Task 
Force' set up in Fakfak to oppose West Papuan security 
forces. Security around the Congress was very tight, with 
every individual being searched at all the entrances. [Tempo 
Jnteraktif, 31 May 2000] 
Jakarta's failure to understand 
Since Abdurrahman Wahid took over as president in 
October, Jakarta has shown an startling lack of understand-
ing about the strength of feeling in West Papua for indepen-
dence. Gus Dur, as the president is popularly known, appar-
ently thinks that by making symbolic concessions such as 
agreeing to rename Irian Jaya as Papua and allowing the 
people to 'express their aspirations' and ' fly their flags ', and 
offering them wide-ranging autonomy, he would win the 
people over to remaining within the Republic . He has 
repeatedly stated that he would never ever allow West Papua 
to separate. This is also the firmly held opinion of Vice 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose father, President 
Sukarno, was responsible for waging a campaign in the 
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fifties and sixties to integrate West Papua into Indonesia, 
who oversaw an unsuccessful military campaign to seize 
the territory in the early 1960s and ordered the occupation 
of the territory in accordance with the terms of the 1962 
New York Agreement. 
At the request of the Presidium Council, Gus Dur 
agreed to attend the Congress on the opening day and 
deliver the opening address. However, he changed his mind 
at the last minute, on the advice of Megawati, and decided 
that to attend would be seen as endorsement of the pro-
independence position it would adopt. However, he had 
already approved a donation of Rp 1 billion (about 
$115,000) to help cover the costs of the gathering. 
After adopting a conciliatory attitude, the government's 
tone changed as the Congress got underway, and it began to 
hurl increasingly shrill accusations against the event. The 
day after it opened, Indonesia's foreign minister, Alwi 
Shihab accused Australian NGOs of inciting violence in 
West Papua. He was quoted in the Indonesian Observer as 
saying: 'Indonesia's foreign policy places Australia as an 
external factor that endangers its national integrity, espe-
cially in Papua,' and alleged that this was being done 
through the intermediary of Australian NGOs. John 
Rumbiak who heads ELS-HAM, the leading human rights 
organisation in West Papua, said these remarks indicated 
that Jakarta wants to destablise the independence congress. 
'It is possible that (the foreign minister) wants to provoke 
the society here.' [Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 2000] 
Australia has become the Indonesian government's 
favourite bogeyman, ever since its armed forces intervened 
in East Timor last September to halt the orgy of violence 
there. 
The following day, the Jakarta government alleged that 
the Congress organisers had deliberately prevented anti-
independence figures from attending. 'They have even 
received threats of violence,' cabinet secretary Marsilam 
Simanjuntak alleged. He said that the Congress could not 
therefore claim to represent the Papuan people. He also said 
the Indonesian government lamented the presence of 
foreigners. 'There is the impression that outside parties are 
meddling in the domestic affairs of Indonesia.' (This was an 
apparent reference to the presence of delegates from Papua 
New Guinea where grassroots support for the independence 
movement in West Papua is known to be strong, and where 
hundreds of West Papuans are still living as exiles and 
refugees. ) [AFP, 31 May 2000] 
A day later, the Indonesian government threatened to 
'take measures' against the Congress if it leads to efforts 
the separate from the Republic. Foreign minister Alwi 
Shihab told a press conference in Jakarta that the president 
would repudiate the permission granted for the Congress to 
be held if the discussions 'go too far'. He said that it would 
be up to the political and security section of the government 
to decide what action to take if 'things went too far'. 
[Antara, 1 June 2000] 
However, it should not have come as a surprise to the 
government that the Papuan People's Congress would adopt 
a robust pro-independence stance and that it would focus 
primarily on how to proceed towards achieving that objec-
tive. The decisions of the preparatory congress held in 
February made that crystal clear. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 
157, April 2000] 
The foreign press reported that the Congress had, 
during the first two days, been dominated by tensions 
between a small number of delegates who favour immedi-
ate movement towards secession and the majority who 
want to pursue the creation of an independence country 
through dialogue and international mediation. The working 
group resolution to aim for a Memorandum of 
Understanding with Jakarta makes it clear that the second 
option was the unanimous position finally adopted. 
Moreover, both co-chairmen have made it clear on many 
occasions that they would pursue the path of peace in the 
struggle for independence. 
The Second Papuan People's Congress which was still in 
progress as we went to press is certain to result in an inten-
sification of tensions in West Papua. The inspiration that has 
given to the thousands who attended, as delegates or as 
supporters outside the hall, is bound to be reflected in 
heightened demands for Jakarta and the world community 
to heed their demands. Those in the leadership of the move-
ment, having decided to pursue the path of negotiation, will 
need to exercise all their skills and influence to keep the 
movement in check. 
As for Jakarta, until now it seems to have believed that 
by letting the West Papuans blow off steam - raising flags 
without hindrance, expressing aspirations - everything 
would settle down into a new, cosy relationship, with the 
injustices of the past forgotten. 
The events that took place in Port Numbay from 29 May 
until 3 June mean that the people of West Papua will need 
the support of a much more powerful campaign of interna-
tional solidarity in the months to come, to help them 
achieve their just demands and to campaign against human 
rights violations that can be expected to intensify in the 
coming weeks and months. 
STOP PRESS 
In a unanimous decision adopted on 4 June, the Second Papuan 
People's Congress decided that the state of Papua would return 
to its status on 1 December 1961 when the independent state of 
Papua was formally declared. The idea that Papua was 'leaving 
the Republic of Indonesia' was rejected because in the view of 
the Congress, it had never been a part of that country. The 
1962 New York Agreement and the 1969 'Act of Free Choibe~ 
were declared invalid and pressure would be exerted on the UN 
to revoke the General Assembly resolution of 1969 which bad 
sealed the country's fate as a part of Indonesia. As front 14 June, 
the Papuan flag, the Morning Star, would be held aloft at all 
times. 
The Congress called for the withdrawal of all lndoileiian 
security forces. All development activities by the I.n~lin 
government should cease forthwith and all compa,11tes, 
including foreign investment, should. pay taxell tt> the'~ 
people. A 10,000 strong defence force called satgiiR' P¥1J!l 
be formed. 
The operations of the Freeport c.ow.er-and-~ c~ ~ 
obtain the consent of the local tribal C(JUJJCt P~ .~~!C}L 
should withdraw from the lndonosl,&ffl ~'W pr. 
Churches (PGI). 
The president and oth.er.MMW~LJ4iiMJIU~.a,i..~~·Ji-Jljjlfi 
they were implacably OPJ:i0f!~U~~111N~~~., 
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Wahid's first six months 
It is now six months since Abdurrahman Wahid rather unexpectedly became Indonesia 's fourth presi-
dent. His biographer Greg Barton said recently: 'If you asked me even in October whether Gus Dur 
would become president, I would have said it was possible, but not likely'. Many say it is sheer luck for 
Indonesia to have this man as its president. It is worth looking at the man and the problems he is 
facing. 
Only days before the presidential election, Gus Dur, as 
Abdurrahman Wahid is popularly known, wasn't even a 
candidate. The general elections had give the PDI-P, the 
secular-nationalist party and its leader, Megawati 
Sukamoputri, the largest vote, making her the natural 
choice. But the indirect presidential election system giving 
the MPR, the People's Congress, the power to choose, cata-
pulted Gus Dur to the presidency. The Poros Tengah 
(Central Axis), a loose coalition of Muslim parties and 
sections of Golkar, the former ruling party, threw its weight 
behind Gus Dur. 
The motives were less than honourable: Gus Dur was 
a Muslim leader and Megawati was a woman. Gus Dur's 
own party, the PKB, had won only 9 per cent of the votes 
but the loose coalition gave him the majority in the 
MPR. Gus Dur has been a public figure for years but the 
general public still have to get used to seeing him func-
tion as president. In the Suharto period, he was the 
leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), probably the largest 
Muslim organisation in the world with 30 million 
members, but he was also leader of Forum Demokrasi 
(Fodem), a secular organisation with social-democratic 
leanings and had been active for many years in the NGO 
movement. 
A secular Muslim leader 
The combination of religiosity and secular realism has 
given Indonesia a highly unusual leader, who has won a lot 
of credit at home and abroad, but his style is far removed 
from the stereotype of a politician - he has shown himself 
to be somebody who steers and manipulates the power 
game in often idiosyncratic ways. Gus Dur has become 
famed (some would say notorious) for his wit and charac-
ter, his ability to handle complicated and delicate matters in 
a light-hearted fashion . His skills of communication are 
second to none but ironically he often puzzles people with 
his statements. 
Gus Dur is for ever making controversial statements, 
damaging his image as a statesman but showing himself to 
be an idealist with high moral principles. While he is deter-
mined to deal with Indonesia's horrific past (see separate 
item), his fixation with maintaining Indonesia's territorial 
integrity is setting him on course for major conflicts in 
Aceh and West Papua. Calling him an idealist is only part 
of the story. In the old days of the New Order, he was very 
much involved as an opposition figure in the day-to-day 
murky politics of the time. 
He has shown himself to be a skilful political operator 
but, being president in the wake of an authoritarian dicta-
torship, he has been forced onto a fast learning curve. The 
economy is in tatters and all the institutions have been 
destroyed. Failure to deal with these problems could be the 
undoing of the country. 
It is too early to say how Gus Dur sees his role as presi-
dent. Is it as trouble-shooter, trying to straighten out the 
country's intractable problems or dealing with the nitty-
gritty slog of reforming the institutions, dealing with the 
unfathomable web of corruption and cleaning up the mess 
that goes under the name of the bureaucracy? 
Many of the changes he must introduce will stir things 
up by undermining the political and economic interests of 
people who benefited from the old regime. Many of the 
reforms he attempts will be very unpopular in certain 
circles. Usually, leaders in transitional periods dealing with 
the ungratifying job of cleaning up such a mess, end up in 
the dustbin of history. Gus Dur's tasks are immense and 
even if he runs for second term, this will not give him time 
to finish the job. The honeymoon period is over and 
obstruction and criticism are now his daily fare . 
The road of reform is clear. Gus Dur has to deal with the 
military, to restore confidence in the economy and to push 
for a total overhaul in the judiciary so as to restore the rule 
of law. He must also find an acceptable solution for the 
people of Aceh and West Papua and find a way to stop the 
unspeakable violence in Ambon. He also has to deal with an 
incompetent and corrupt bureaucracy. 
Dealing with the military 
The main stumbling block on the road to democracy is 
the military. For more than thirty years, the military enjoyed 
virtual impunity and, especially in the first ten years of 
Suharto's rule, they wielded huge economic and political 
power. The Indonesian military have been correctly 
described not only as the guardian of security and order but 
also as the best organised political force . In order to exercise 
this power, the military made itself an important economic 
player in both the formal and increasingly in the informal 
sector of the economy. 
Much to everyone's surprise, Gus Dur was resolute in 
using his powers to handle this TNI power-house. Within a 
few months, several paradigms of the TNI were smashed. 
General Wiranto, the powerful co-ordinating minister for 
security and politics, was sent packing, together with nearly 
two hundred senior officers [see TAPOL Bulletin No. 157, 
April 2000]. There have been radical changes at the top and 
many key positions have been given to navy and airforce 
officers, a radical departure from the Suharto period. The 
TNI commander-in-chief, the head of military intelligence 
and the official spokesperson are all non-army people. 
The whole world watched as Gus Dur dealt with General 
Wiranto, the highest and most influential officer from the 
Suharto period. Gus Dur gave the general time to send in his 
resignation and when Wiranto refused, he was unceremoni-
ously sacked. The sacking of Wiranto and others has 
changed the political climate in Indonesia. People now see 
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that high officers are not supermen and can be removed 
with a simple letter of dismissal. 
The reduction of the TNI to nothing more than a defence 
force is now much closer. The territorial structure of the 
armed forces, a virtual shadow government from top to 
bottom, is being partly dismantled. Officers are no longer 
allowed to hold positions in the civil administration and 
must retire from the forces if they do. Many officers are still 
licking their wounds and the battle is far from over. The TNI 
enjoyed unlimited powers for over three decades and still 
have many cards up their sleeves to re-emerge as a political 
entity. Gus Dur believes that 90 per cent of the TNI are 
behind him, but this is probably wishful thinking on his 
part, to convey a message of confidence. The widely-held 
belief that most senior officers are Wahid loyalists still has 
to be tested. The new batch of officers are indeed pro-
reform but probably do not account for more than 10 per 
cent of the force . An equal amount are actively anti-reform. 
Events in West Timor and Aceh would suggest that lower 
down, commanding officers have their own agenda. The 
well-organised acts of violence in Aceh, Maluku and else-
where are likely to be the work of such officers. Most TNI 
offices are adopting a wait-and-see attitude and will make 
their position clear once the TNI's programme of reform 
begins to take effect. 
There have been sinister noises coming from within the 
military establishment of the possibility of a Pakistan-style 
solution if civilian politicians prove incapable of success-
fully running the country. Although, as we show below, the 
problems confronting the state are frightening complex, the 
irony is that much of the unrest plaguing the country is 
being stage-managed by forces within the military. 
Reforming the judiciary 
Everyone agrees that the judiciary is rotten to the core. 
It is a public secret that the majority of judges and prosecu-
tors are up for grabs. Surveys by NGOs have concluded that 
the entire Supreme Court should be replaced, that twenty of 
the twenty-three higher court judges should be removed 
and that practically everyone in the attorney general's office 
should be sacked. This creates structural problems for a 
wide range of reform measures. 
Foreign investors feel insecure with such an unpre-
dictable legal system. In the old days, business connections 
with the Suharto family was the guarantee for fruitful busi-
ness deals. The chances of putting higher TNI officers on 
trial for their crimes against humanity remains remote. The 
draft law on a human rights court is stuck in parliament (see 
separate item). It is also unclear whether perpetrators of 
economic crimes like corruption and embezzlement will 
end up in court. The public at large remains cynical of the 
system and the sense that justice is being done is lacking. 
The Gus Dur government can do its utmost to accelerate 
the process of reform in the judiciary, the parliament can 
adopt new, appropriate laws but it will take time to clean up 
the stable, years will be needed before a competent genera-
tion of judges and prosecutors emerge to take over. 
And what about the economy? 
The economy is in a shambles and Gus Dur, cannot 
claim to have any expertise in this area. The banking system 
collapsed during the Asian crisis in 1997. Three years on, 
the situation has barely changed. On paper all the conglom-
erates are bankrupt and only one has re-emerged under 
foreign ownership. The two problems are intertwined, the 
banking system is in dire straits because of unpaid debts by 
defaulting tycoons aka cronies. So far none of the major 
Suharto cronies have been taken court though one, Bob 
Hasan, is now under investigation and feeling the rigours of 
life in a prison cell. 
On the surface, things are not too bad. There has been a 
revival in consumer demand, the fiscal position seems to be 
under control and the trade surplus in the first three months 
of 2000 was US$7 .57 billion. As with other Asian 
economies, moderate economic growth has set in. But the 
economic fundamentals remain feeble and financial and 
economic restructuring is sluggish, to say the least. The 
IMF is responding to the continuing Indonesian crisis in the 
same way as it is handling Russia; it knows that things are 
desperate but the international community is determined 
not to let the Indonesian economy go under. It was in this 
spirit that a new Letter of Intent was signed in May between 
the IMF and the government. 
The Gus Dur government is bending over backwards to 
woo foreign investors, but to little effect. Such a policy also 
brings his government into direct conflict with local 
communities whose land and other rights have been 
violated egregiously for more than three decades (see sepa-
rate item). Regional administrations are also trying to assert 
their control over foreign investors for tax evasion and 
other crimes, putting them on a collision course with the 
centre. It remains to be seen how this will be develop when 
the regional autonomy law comes into effect. 
Gus Dur has made strenuous efforts to entice Indonesian 
Chinese capital to return home. After the May 1998 riots 
which seriously hit the Indonesian Chinese, many decided 
to park their money abroad in Singapore, Hong Kong and 
elsewhere. The fact that there have been no moves as yet to 
investigate the 1998 riots does not help. Indonesia badly 
needs fresh capital to give a new impetus to the economy 
and provide jobs for the 36 million or so people now out of 
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work and absorb the millions of youngsters entering the 
labour market every year. 
. Inyest~rs are also wary about the explosive political 
s1tuat10n m ~~ny parts of Indonesia. Continual feuding 
between Chnstrnns and Muslims in Maluku which is now 
spreadi~g to Central Sulawesi, and a bomb explosion at a 
c~urch m Medan has hardly increased this confidence. 
Smee Gus Dur took office, the rupiah has fallen in value by 
11 per cent, and the Jakarta composite index of leading 
shares has seen 15 per cent shaved off its value. 
The problems are complex and it is difficult to expect any 
government to end this economic nightmare in a short time. 
Gus Dur and the political elite 
Having inherited a corrupt and disabled state, it was 
clear from the start that the cabinet ministers Gus Dur 
appointed with little regard for competence and experience 
would not be able to implement the drastic reforms needed. 
They were also confronted by a bureaucracy that balked at 
any talk of reform. This has beenparticularly so in the 
departments dealing with the economy and justice, the two 
critically important sectors that are crying out for reform. 
One of the main features of Suharto's New Order was 
loyalty to superiors which created a system where patron-
client relationships reign supreme and where performance 
is less important than being loyal to the boss. Moreover, 
the Indonesian bureaucracy is huge because it is burdened 
by a glittering array of corrupt officials in hundreds of state 
companies ranging from Pertamina, the state oil company, 
to small plantations in remote parts of the provinces. Gus 
Dur has made moves to replace many of these corrupt offi-
cials but the pace is painfully slow because of resistance 
within these state bodies. 
Scandals abound and only help to lower confidence in 
the ability of the government to govern. The latest scandal 
has exploded in Bulog and is hitting right at the heart of the 
government. Bulog holds a state monopoly on the purchase 
and distribution of rice and other essential food products. It 
has been one of the most lucrative sources of kickbacks and 
was always held tightly under the control of the Suharto 
family and trusted cronies. Efforts to replace top officials 
have been met with strong resistance. 
But now a Bulog-gate scandal has exploded right in Gus 
Dur's face, involving his masseur and his trusted state secre-
tary, Bondan Gunawan who was forced to resign because, as 
he said, to continue in office would only exacerbate the 
problems being faced by the president. 
A few weeks earlier Gus Dur sacked two ministers from 
the economic team. One of them was Laksamana Sukardi, 
the minister in charge of state companies, who had the 
thankless task of overhauling the state enterprise sector. His 
attempts to introduce changes were sabotaged at many 
levels. Although Gus Dur gave corruption as the reason for 
sacking Sukardi, no one believes this. The more likely 
reason is that Sukardi had too many enemies, even within 
his own party, the PDI-P, which lifted not a finger to support 
him against this groundless allegation. There is growing 
suspicion that Megawati's husband stands behind this 
disgraceful example of scapegoating. 
Higher officials in the bureaucracy, the new middle class 
which came to life in the Suharto period, enjoyed many 
privileges and served as the backbone of the old regime. 
Many feel threatened by the wave of reforms. They stand in 
the way of reform now dangerously stuck in a mire of polit-
ical mud-slinging which could even threatened the presi-
dent's hold on office. 
Gus Dur has come under attack from the very politicians 
who catapulted him to power, perhaps in a show of their 
ability to put him back into the box from which he sprung 
so unexpectedly last October. 
In August this year, the MPR will hold a plenary session 
and could, if it wishes, call the president to account, or even 
impeach him. The session will be a political event that could 
have major consequences for Indonesia's future. 
Dark forces who have the capacity to instigate unrest 
anywhere in the country can be expected to use the next 
three months to spread chaos and undermine the govern-
ment. Don't be surprised, therefore, if the troubles in 
places like Maluku and Aceh continue to flare up and even 
intensify as August approaches. 
Wahid wants 1966 decree to be revoked 
President Abdurrahmait Wahid has taken on virtually the whole political elite by demanding that a 
decree adopted in July 1966 by the supreme legislative assembly banning the Indonesian Communist 
Party and the dissemination of Marxist teachings should be revoked. Even though all but one of the 
parties represented in the assembly reject the idea, he has stuck to his guns on the issue. 
TAP XXV /1966 as it is known was adopted four months 
after General Suharto wrested state powers from President 
Sukarno and used these powers to ban the Communist 
Party (PK.I) on 13 March 1966, along with dozens of mass 
organisations alleged to be affiliated to the PK.I. Hundreds 
of thousands of people had already been slaughtered in 
massacres and hundreds of thousands were being held in 
jails and military detention centres up and down the coun-
try. The MPRS (the S signifies that it was a provisional 
body) had been purged of more than a hundred members 
who had been replaced by Suharto appointees. Suharto 
needed this decree to 'legitimise' his obliteration of the PK.I 
and endorse his claim that the PK.I had masterminded the 
events on 1 October 1965, the so-called G30S/PKI coup 
attempt, which he crushed and in so doing, took control of 
the armed forces and set up a special command for the 
'restoration of security and order' .. 
That was 35 years ago. In many respects, the decree is 
largely ignored in today's Indonesia. A visitor to any of the 
major bookshops in Indonesia will be struck by the number 
of books about Marxism piled high on the shelves, being 
eagerly thumbed by shoppers. Oom Jenggot, the 'bearded 
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uncle', is probably more popular amongst the younger 
generation in Indonesia than in most countries of the world. 
And Marxist philosophy and economics are on the syllabus 
in many universities. Be that as it may, the retention of this 
unlawful decree represents a serious attack on freedom of 
expression and the right to organise. 
An issue of principle 
The downfall of Suharto and the beginnings of a reform 
era in Indonesia has not cured most of the country's older 
generation of politicians of their deep-seated anti-commu-
nism. They responded with horror at the thought that this 
cold war relic could be revoked and have even threatened 
to impeach Gus Dur, as the president is known, if he 
presses ahead with the proposal. 
While commentators lambaste Gus Dur for frequently 
contradicting himself, saying one thing one day and some-
thing quite different the next day, he has been consistent on 
this one, returning to the issue time and time again, even 
though he knows that it is losing him support from those 
who shoe-horned him into the presidency. The loudest 
howls have come from the parties within the poros tengah, 
or 'central axis', a coalition composed largely of smaller 
Muslim parties under the leadership of Amien Rais, which 
came into being last October to prevent Megawati from 
becoming president. 
The president clearly sees this as a moral issue, a way of 
achieving national reconciliation, a matter of principle. It is 
the logical follow-up of his forthright statement in March 
calling for an investigation into the 1965 killings and apol-
ogising to the victims for the part played in the slaughter by 
members of his own organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. [See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 157, April 2000] 
Returning for the umpteenth time to the theme on a 
popular TV talk show, he went over the heads of the politi-
cal elite and turned to the public for support. He expressed 
the conviction that the majority of people 'did not care 
(about), let alone oppose' his proposal and that the opposi-
tion had so far only come from a handful of the country's 
elite. He warned this elite that ignoring 'the silent majority' 
could cost them votes in the next elections. 
He said he was pushing ahead with his proposal to meet 
his constitutional duties to uphold human rights, respect for 
freedom of expression and restore the rule of law in 
Indonesia. Insisting that the MPRS Decree is not a 'sacred 
document', he said: 'You cannot ban a teaching. You, or 
society, can oppose it but the state does not have the author-
ity to outlaw a teaching. Once you empower the state to ban 
a teaching, there's no stopping it.' [Jakarta Post, 21 May 
2000] 
Indeed, there was no stopping Suharto's New Order. 
Having banned communism and outlawed the PKI, the 
regime went on to force political parties to merge into two 
parties in order to pave the way for GOLK.AR to sweep the 
board in elections, then forced all parties and organisations 
to accept Pancasila as their 'sole ideology'. 
NGO support but Komnas HAM holds 
back 
Many human rights NGOs have called for the decree to 
be revoked. Twelve of the leading human rights NGOs 
made representations to the National Human Rights 
Commission, Komnas HAM, to urge it to support the 
demand. Speaking for the group, Coki Naipospos of 
Solidamor said that the commission's secretary, Albert 
' .. Hasibun, had told them they had not yet adopted a position. 
[Indonesian Observer, 25 April 2000] Ironically, some 
months ago, when Komnas HAM was asked by the Institute 
for the Study of the 1965/66 Massacres, the YPKP, and 
Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa to set up a special investigation 
commission into the 1965166 massacres, they were told that 
this would not be possible because TAP XXV /1965 was still 
in force. [See Press Statement by the SNB, 1 March 2000] 
Hendardi, director of the PBHI, told the press that the 
decree had given the New Order the powers to commit 
massive human rights violations and to purge their political 
opponent by accusing them of being communist. Many 
people were victimised because having been so accused, 
they could not defend themselves in court. [Indonesian 
Observer, 26 April 2000] 
MPR will reject the proposal 
As the president himself knows, the final decision on the 
decree rests with the MPR, the People's Congress. In 
preparing for the forthcoming plenary session in August, 
the working committee of the MPR which consists of all the 
party factions decided unanimously to refuse to revoke the 
1966 decree. The only party which went against the stream 
was the PKB, the party which was set up by Nahdlatul 
Ulama, and which initially supported the president's posi-
tion. It tried to persuade others in the Working committee to 
agree at least to amend the decree with a clause making it 
unlawful for the government to discrimination against 
descendants of members of the PKI but this was rejected. 
Chozin Chumaidy, representing the Muslim PPP, claimed 
that such an amendment would give the impression that the 
PKI 'was being given special favours'. 'We were all suffer-
ing from discrimination in those days. That was part of the 
political climate,' he said, ignoring the fact that it was the 
decree that had set the tone for this situation. [Kompas, 30 
May 2000] 
Continued from page 16 
In a message to the international solidarity network, 
Solidamor stressed that it was important to exert pressure on 
the police to investigate the incident thoroughly and punish 
the perpetrators. 'This will be a test case for the Indonesian 
authorities of the seriousness with which they will pursue 
not only our case but the far greater crimes committed by 
Indonesian forces in East Timor.' 
They asked people everywhere to press the Indonesian 
authorities to pursue the investigations vigorously by faxing 
a letter to: 
General Rudihardjo, national chief of police: 
62-21 721-8000 
Major-General Nurfaizi, Jakarta chief of police 
62-21 23 4237 
Colonel Timur Pradoko, Central Jakarta chief of police: 
62-21 390-9922 or 390-9623. 
Indonesian embassies in your own country. 
Send messages of support to: solidmor@centrin.net.id 
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Communities challenge foreign investors 
As a consequence of Indonesia's transition to democracy, local communities are beginning to resist the 
exploitation of their land and resources by foreign companies. The way in which the government and 
companies respond to the communities' demands for the redistribution of wealth, the re-negotiation of 
contracts and environmental protection will be a crucial test of their commitment to democratic reform 
and the rights of local people. 
Since the downfall of Suharto in May 1998, foreign 
investors, particularly mining companies, have been forced 
to re-assess their responsibilities to local communities. 
Under Suharto, many companies were granted privileged 
contracts tainted by corruption and by the exclusion of 
local people from the decision-making process. Royalties 
and taxes flowed to the central government and local 
people had no control over the social and environmental 
impact of commercial activities. Protests against the 
companies were ruthlessly suppressed. Now local authori-
ties want more money from the companies and more 
control over their operations. 
Leading companies, such as Britain 's Rio Tinto, have 
responded by stressing the sanctity of legal contracts and 
resisting attempts to re-negotiate their terms. The govern-
ment of President Wahid, keen to attract new investment 
and fearful of undermining investor confidence, has re-
affirmed the supremacy of existing contracts. However, 
issues such as the equitable distribution of wealth, social 
responsibility and protection of the environment are now 
firmly on the agenda. The companies are being forced to 
decide whether their responsibilities go beyond the letter of 
legal contracts. They are being made to consider whether 
it is good business practice to provoke greater resistance to 
their activities by refusing to make concessions to local 
people. 
New challenges are also being thrown up by moves 
towards greater political and economic decentralisation. 
These moves are partly a response to separatist demands 
fuelled by long-standing economic injustices. A new law 
on regional autonomy and financial sharing was passed by 
the Habibie government in 1999. President Wahid recently 
signed a regulation to implement the new law as from 
January 2001. The law provides for the provinces to receive 
a much larger proportion of royalties currently paid to 
central government. It remains to be seen whether this will 
lead to more local democracy or simply a transfer of power 
from central elites to local elites. 
The minister for regional autonomy has stated that the 
contracts of Freeport and Newmont (see below) and others 
will remain under central government control [DTE, 45, 
May 2000]. 
The Freeport contract 
The Freeport/Rio Tinto contract has come under partic-
ular scrutiny in recent months. The copper-and-gold 
mining operation in West Papua, considered to be the 
cornerstone of western investment in Indonesia, has been 
intensely controversial for its links to the family and 
cronies of Suharto, its exploitation of indigenous land 
rights, degradation of the environment, violation_ ~f hui:nan 
rights and its failure to benefit local commumtles smce 
work began at the beginning of the 1970s. Some of the 
problems at the mine were tragically illustrated at the begin-
ning of May when a landslide of waste dump collapsed into 
Wanagon Lake and triggered flooding which swept four 
workers to their deaths. 
Questions have been raised as to whether the original 
Freeport contract signed in 1967 was valid since at the time 
West Papua was not internationally recognised as part of 
Indonesia, and whether the current contract signed in 1991 
should be amended. Government ministers seem to be 
divided on the issue between those who have attacked the 
company's environmental record and those concerned about 
damaging investor confidence. A parliamentary mission to 
the mine last December recommended that the government 
review Freeport's contract as it has Jed to social and 
economic injustice, rampant human rights abuse and politi-
cal tension. A new investigation into human rights abuses in 
West Papua dating back to 1963 - including those relating to 
the Freeport operation - was announced recently by the 
minister for human rights, Hasballah Saad [Straits Times, 27 
May]. 
Freeport has done its reputation no good by employing 
bullying tactics to protect its existing contract. In February, 
former US Secretary of State and Freeport board member, 
Henry Kissinger, informed the government in no uncertain 
terms that it had to honour the contract 'in the interests of 
Indonesia' . Bizarrely, President Wahid responded by 
appointing Kissinger as a special political adviser. 
US ambassador Robert Gelbard weighed in by calling 
on USAID to cut its funding to WALHI, the Indonesian 
environmental organisation, which accused Kissinger of 
intimidation, and to turn down a request for funding from 
JATAM, a Jakarta-based mining advocacy group. In 1999, 
citing human rights abuses and environmental destruction 
caused by mining, JATAM had called for a moratorium on 
all mining activities and for the suspension of all mining 
licences. It is understood that as a result of this intervention, 
JATAM will not get the funding it needs. 
The interventions by Kissinger and Gelbard caused 
outrage in the US where over 3,500 people, including 
private investors wrote protest letters to Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright. Friends of the Earth said: 'We strongly 
urge the US State Department to support Indonesia's fragile 
democracy rather than protect sweetheart deals for 
American corporations ' [JPS, 15 May] 
Rio Tinto's Kelian mine blockaded 
Rio Tinto 's Kelian gold mine in East Kalimantan has 
been blockaded since early May by thousands of local 
Dayak people dissatisfied by the breakdown of negotiations 
over compensation for land, crops and property, over human 
rights violations and the damage done to the livelihoods of 
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small-scale miners evicted from the concession, and over 
pollution, and mine closure plans. 
Kelian is the largest primary gold mine in Indonesia. 
The open-pit operation produces over 400,000 ounces of 
gold equivalent a year. The mine operator, PT Kelian 
Equatorial Mining (PT KEM) is 90 per cent owned by 
London-based Rio Tinto. The mine is due to close in 
2003/4. 
There was deadlock in the negotiations with the local 
community after the company involved the local govern-
ment in discussions over land compensation. The protesters 
have forced the closure of the mine and prevented produc-
tion for several weeks. At least 20,000 ounces of production 
have been lost to date. 
Court overrules Newmont closure 
The threat to existing mining contracts posed by moves 
towards regional autonomy was illustrated by the fate of the 
Newmont gold mine in Sulawesi. The mine, which is 
owned by the Newmont Mining Corp. of the US, was a 
particular target of JATAM's attack on the environmental 
record of the mining industry. 
Last year, the local authority in the Minahasa regency 
sued Newmont in a local court for about $8 million in 
unpaid taxes and damages owed on waste rock and soil 
removed from the mining site. In April, the court ordered 
Newmont to shut the mine pending resolution of the 
dispute. But the Supreme Court overruled the closure order. 
The local authority dropped its claims and Newmont agreed 
to pay between $400,000 and $500,000 in taxes on overbur-
den. In court, Newmont, backed by the central government, 
had argued that it was exempt from paying taxes on 'over-
burden' materials in the mining contract it signed with 
Jakarta. 
Despite the settlement, the intervention of central 
government and the Supreme Court ruling are worrying 
setbacks for local democracy and a reminder that the law 
is essentially conservative in its dealings with contractual 
obligations and property rights. Local people attempting 
to overturn unfair contracts must rely more on the power 
of protest than the sympathy of the courts to realise their 
right to a fairer share of the wealth generated by local 
resources. 
Widespread opposition 
Complaints about the activities of foreign-owned or 
foreign-financed companies are many and various. Other 
operations affected include PT Inti Indorayon 's paper, pulp 
and rayon fibre plant in North Sumatra, forced to close in 
1998 following local anger over pollution, PT TEL paper 
pulp factory in South Sumatra, PT Inco Indonesia, a 
subsidiary of Canada-based Inco Ltd, which has come under 
fire over its nickel mining operations in Sulawesi, PT Indo 
Muro Kencana, 90 per cent owned by Australia's Aurora 
Gold, where 11 villagers including three children were 
arrested by heavily armed police in March for occupying the 
mining site and Mobil Exxon, the US multinational badly 
affected by the deteriorating security situation in Aceh. [For 
more details of the issues surrounding these and other oper-
ations, see recent issues of Down to Earth, the newsletter of 
the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in 
Indonesia, dte@gn.apc.org] 
Resorting to the security approach? 
In a worrying sign that old habits die hard, some mi~is­
ters appear to regard the increasing demands on foreign 
companies as essentially a security problem. The newly-
appointed minister of industry and trade, Lieutenant-
General Luhut Pandjaitan, who was chosen by the president 
to take over the portfolio after being impressed with his 
approach towards foreign investors while he was Indonesian 
ambassador in Singapore, announced that his ministry and 
the military have agreed to work together 'to create a 
conducive and safe environment for businesses operating in 
the country'. He said: 'The TNI commander has agreed and 
will launch measures at his disposal, together with the 
Indonesian police, to help ensure security to boost our 
exports.' [Jakarta Post, 9 May]. Such an approach does not 
augur well for the activities oflocal communities and NGOs 
in their efforts to right past wrongs. 
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